Arizona woman accused of helping North Koreans get remote IT jobs at 300 companies

Illustration of a judge's gavel on a digital background resembling a computer circuit board.
Getty Images | the-lightwriter

An Arizona woman has been accused of helping generate millions of dollars for North Korea’s ballistic missile program by helping citizens of that country land IT jobs at US-based Fortune 500 companies.

Christina Marie Chapman, 49, of Litchfield Park, Arizona, raised $6.8 million in the scheme, federal prosecutors said in an indictment unsealed Thursday. Chapman allegedly funneled the money to North Korea’s Munitions Industry Department, which is involved in key aspects of North Korea’s weapons program, including its development of ballistic missiles.

Part of the alleged scheme involved Chapman and co-conspirators compromising the identities of more than 60 people living in the US and using their personal information to get North Koreans IT jobs across more than 300 US companies.

In the indictment, prosecutors wrote:

The conspiracy perpetrated a staggering fraud on a multitude of industries, at the expense of generally unknowing US companies and persons. It impacted more than 300 US companies, compromised more than 60 identities of US persons, caused false information to be conveyed to DHS on more than 100 occasions, created false tax liabilities for more than 35 US persons, and resulted in at least $6.8 million of revenue to be generated for the overseas IT workers. The overseas IT workers worked at blue-chip US companies, including a top-5 national television network and media company, a premier Silicon Valley technology company, an aerospace and defense manufacturer, an iconic American car manufacturer, a high-end retail chain, and one of the most recognizable media and entertainment companies in the world, all of which were Fortune 500 companies.

As another part of the alleged conspiracy, Chapman operated a “laptop farm” at one of her residences to give the employers the impression the North Korean IT staffers were working from within the US; the laptops were issued by the employers. By using proxies and VPNs, the overseas workers appeared to be connecting from US-based IP addresses. Chapman also received employees’ paychecks at her home, prosecutors said.

Federal prosecutors said that Chapman and three North Korean IT workers—using the aliases of Jiho Han, Chunji Jin, Haoran Xu, and others—had been working since at least 2020 to plan a remote-work scheme. In March of that year, prosecutors said, an individual messaged Chapman on LinkedIn and invited her to “be the US face” of their company. From August to November of 2022, the North Korean IT workers allegedly amassed guides and other information online designed to coach North Koreans on how to write effective cover letters and résumés and falsify US Permanent Resident Cards.

Under the alleged scheme, the foreign workers developed “fictitious personas and online profiles to match the job requirements” and submitted fake documents to the Homeland Security Department as part of an employment eligibility check. Chapman also allegedly discussed with co-conspirators about transferring the money earned from their work.

“The charges in this case should be a wakeup call for American companies and government agencies that employ remote IT workers,” Nicole Argentieri, head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, said. “These crimes benefited the North Korean government, giving it a revenue stream and, in some instances, proprietary information stolen by the co-conspirators.”

The indictment came alongside a criminal complaint charging a Ukrainian man with carrying out a similar multiyear scheme. Oleksandr Didenko, 27, of Kyiv, Ukraine, allegedly helped individuals in North Korea “market” themselves as remote IT workers.

Chapman was arrested Wednesday. It wasn’t immediately known when she or Didenko were scheduled to make their first appearance in court. If convicted, Chapman faces 97.5 years in prison, and Didenko faces up to 67.5 years.

https://arstechnica.com/?p=2025081




Beyond encryption: The zero-knowledge revolution for personal data

The organizations underpinning our most crucial societal functions, from financial and educational institutions to healthcare companies, suffer regularly from data breaches. This jeopardizes not just privacy, but critical day-to-day operations as the average breach results in $4.45M in financial losses.

While zero-knowledge architecture has already gained traction in the security sphere, now is the time for all industries to bolster the protection of user data as threats targeting industries like finance, retail and transportation multiply daily. 

This type of framework should be at the core of any SaaS solution that handles sensitive private data for its customers. With a multitude of benefits, zero-knowledge provides higher protection standards around user data and privacy as well as an overall decrease in risk vectors for an organization.

What is zero-knowledge?

Zero-knowledge is a privacy and security concept where the provider ensures to the user that they can never access specific data or content belonging to the user. A key component of zero-knowledge is the encryption and decryption of data locally on the user’s device so that no clear-text data is ever transmitted or stored by the provider.

Another way to think about this concept is a bank heist: thieves want to access a vault, though they first need to break into the bank and beat the main security (e.g., the door that gives access to all the individual vaults). Then, they need two keys — one key needs to be stolen from the bank director, and the other from the owner of the vault. There are two keys to ensure that the bank director alone cannot access the contents of the vault, even though they are storing valuables or money on your behalf, and that the owner of the vault controls a critical piece of its protection — something that the vault can never be opened without.

Applied more widely, such architectures would help inform better data custody practices across industries, from patient health records to permanent academic files to account credentials.

Reaping the benefits of zero-knowledge

From enhanced cryptography and future-proofed compliance to the utmost protection from skyrocketing breach costs (particularly as the average cost of a data breach has risen 15% in the last three years), the benefits of zero-knowledge principles make investing in this architecture evident for companies dealing with sensitive user data — yet providers continue to leave security holes in their products. Security-minded organizations stand out by constructing zero-knowledge frameworks from launch rather than retrofitting them.

When it comes to zero-knowledge, organizations should consider these core benefits:

  • The protection of user data and privacy. Zero-knowledge systems allow users to trust that their data remains private and secure, and can only be accessed by them. This ensures that even in the event of a breach, the amount of exposed user data is limited. This can be particularly useful in healthcare settings, especially with a daily average of two health data hacks or thefts of at least 500 records in 2023 in the United States.
  • Reduced risk and liability for organizations. In case of a breach, the exposure for organizations is limited thanks to a zero-knowledge architecture, since most of the users’ sensitive data is encrypted and cannot be decrypted without the user.
  • Easier data regulation compliance. Zero-knowledge actively minimizes the amount of data stored and processed over time. Data minimization aids in meeting benchmarks like HIPAA, the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) and strict education regulations. Organizations that implement zero-knowledge or employ a zero-knowledge vendor can expect to move quickly through any questions about data privacy. By implementing zero-knowledge architectures, organizations can minimize the use of PII and sensitive data and ensure compliance with data protection regulations while delivering efficient and seamless user experiences.

What now?

SaaS providers should integrate zero-knowledge frameworks into their architecture or risk exposing customer data and facing financial and reputational consequences. At the same time, consumers must also vote with their wallets, opting for services fortified by zero-knowledge protections to spur adoption.

New technologies such as confidential computing and cloud secure enclaves are also making it more accessible to implement zero-knowledge solutions today. Instead of relying on local on-device encryption that requires complex technical implementations and the end-user to manage part of the process, by leveraging cloud services such as Nitro AWS, you can develop a zero-knowledge architecture more easily and provide both a secure and convenient application of zero-knowledge data management.

The writing is on the wall after last year’s endless high-profile security debacles. Any business leader managing sensitive user data needs to not only reassess but also revolutionize their approach.

Leading with privacy and security means embracing innovations like zero-knowledge systems as foundational building blocks, not optional add-ons. 

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100667-beyond-encryption-the-zero-knowledge-revolution-for-personal-data




59% of organizations faced a software supply chain attack

A report by the Ponemon Institute found that 59% of organizations experienced a software supply chain attack, with 54% of these respondents having experienced one in the past year. This survey was conducted among 1,278 IT and IT security practitioners, with managers, directors and senior executives making up nearly half (49%) of the survey demographic.

28% of respondents state that a previously detected, unpatched open-source vulnerability was the cause of the software supply chain attack, while 23% report a zero-day vulnerability as the cause. Out of these organizations, 50% took more than a month to respond to the incident. 

Responses from those surveyed suggests a lack of commitment (from organizations and/or executives) to mitigate the risk of malicious code/malware. Only 45% report that their organizations have a system in place for defending against malicious open-source packages, and only 39% believe that their senior leadership is highly dedicated to mitigating these risks in software supply chains. 

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100666-59-of-organizations-faced-a-software-supply-chain-attack




Michigan school district deploys AI gun detection, intelligent situational awareness platform

A Michigan school district has selected an artificial intelligence (AI)-based gun detection platform as a way to proactively protect its students and faculty against gun-related violence.

 ZeroEyes, the creators of the only AI-based gun detection video analytics platform that holds the U.S. Department of Homeland Security SAFETY Act Designation, recently announced that its proactive gun detection and intelligent situational awareness solution will be deployed by Michigan’s Olivet Community Schools to protect students and faculty against gun-related violence. The school was approved for the State’s dedicated grant funding, enabling Olivet to implement ZeroEyes.

Olivet Community Schools comprises an elementary school, as well as a middle and high school that are located at the same complex. According to The Gun Violence Research Center, 55% of the incidents analyzed in Michigan educational systems were spontaneous attacks and 42% involved former students. To combat the rising threat of violence, the district has been bolstering its safety and security efforts by installing an access control system and brand-new digital cameras, along with the deployment of the new technology.

“We’ve always maintained a multi-layered security framework, from our security camera and access control system to CRG maps for first responders, and adding ZeroEyes significantly strengthens our preparedness,” said John Mertz, Superintendent of Olivet Community Schools. “While this technology greatly enhances our security, we hope we never have to use it in a real-world situation.”

The AI gun detection and intelligent situational awareness software layers onto existing digital security cameras. If a gun is identified, images are instantly shared with the ZeroEyes Operations Center (ZOC), staffed 24/7/365 by specially trained U.S. military and law enforcement veterans. If these experts determine that the threat is valid, they dispatch alerts and actionable intelligence — including visual description, gun type, and last known location — to local law enforcement and the district’s school resource officers as quickly as three to five seconds from detection.

A variety of K-12 school districts and other industries have adopted gun detection technology to improve building safety.

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100671-michigan-school-district-deploys-ai-gun-detection-intelligent-situational-awareness-platform




Google risolve una vulnerabilità zero-day: è la terza in una settimana


Ieri Google ha comunicato di aver risolto una vulnerabilità zero-day già sfruttata dagli attaccanti che colpisce Chrome nelle versioni precedenti alla 125.0.6422.60.

Il bug, CVE-2024-4947, segnalato da due ricercatori di Kaspersky, è una vulnerabilità di type confusion che colpisce l’engine V8 di JavaScript di Chromium e consente a un attaccante di eseguire codice da remoto in una sandbox utilizzando una pagina HTML creata ad hoc.

La vulnerabilità, considerata a rischio alto, è la terza zero-day scoperta questa settimana da Google: le altre due sono la CVE-2024-4671 e la CVE-2024-4949, entrambe patchate con l’ultima versione stabile di Chrome.

La prima è una vulnerabilità di user after free presente in Visuals nelle versioni di Chrome precedenti alla 124.0.6367.201 che consente a un attaccante remoto che è riuscito a compromettere il processo di render di eseguire un sandbox escape. Il secondo è un altro bug di user after free che colpisce l’engine V8 che consente a un attaccante remoto di sfruttare un heap corruption usando una specifica pagina HTML.

Nella nota di sicurezza pubblicata ieri, anche Microsoft ha confermato che la CVE-2024-4671, presente su Edge, è stata sfruttata da gruppi di attaccanti. Al momento però la compagnia non ha ancora rilasciato fix di sicurezza per il proprio browser.

Pixabay

La 4947 è la settima vulnerabilità zero-day che colpisce Chrome dall’inizio dell’anno. Da gennaio a oggi i ricercatori hanno infatti individuato un bug out-of-bound sempre nell’engine V8 di Jabascript, una vulnerabilità di type confusion nello standard WebAssembly, un bug user-after-free nell’API WebCodecs e una out-of-bound read in V8, più queste ultime tre vulnerabilità.

Gli altri bug individuati consentono di accedere a informazioni sensibili dell’utente ed eseguire codice remoto, sempre utilizzando una pagina HTML creata appositamente dall’attaccante.

È fondamentale aggiornare il prima possibile Chrome all’ultima versione disponibile e controllare il sito del vendor per eventuali aggiornamenti.

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Understanding the alert budget: A security team’s second ledger

When we think of a budget, elements like money, time and energy typically come to mind; alerts, not so much. But alerts can saturate security teams and burn people out — and with security teams perpetually short-staffed and the rate of cybersecurity breaches on the rise, effectively managing alerts is critical. 

The solution? Explicitly managing your alert budget. Whether you know it or not, you have one. 

What is an alert budget?

An alert budget is a site reliability engineering (SRE) concept used to measure the volume of alerts (measured by combining the number of alerts and the complexity of their handling) that an organization can effectively handle. If you know what your budget is, you can make better decisions about whether you can effectively handle adding new types of alerts or detecting issues with additional systems, as well as what tools to invest in to help you manage your alerts. 

We need tools that effectively manage alert budgets for two reasons. First, security teams have limited time. Second, there are more alerts than we can look at manually. Once a budget is properly managed it’s possible to build efficiency into teams, processes and tools. 

Time is money and money is time 

Security teams have a limited amount of time to handle alerts, so we can think of seconds and minutes as their money. For example, a foobar alert might eat up 5 minutes to handle, but a bazbop alert might take 30 seconds; handling 10 foobar alerts and 60 bazbop alerts eats up 80 minutes. Adding up this workload can be tricky, because the time in question comes from both the security and system owner’s budget. How busy those teams are varies from company to company and can be taken into account in a more complex version of this budget detailing these considerations. 

Given these guidelines, security teams apply alert budgets like financial budgets to buy a specific resource: incidents. “Buying” incidents means that your security team is finding incidents, something you want to do as quickly as possible to minimize use of the limited time. 

Not every team has to track their alert budget explicitly in time. Some can track it through the number of alerts or another proxy metric, but the idea is the same: you need to have enough budget to cover your alerts. As a CISO, you want to keep alert budgets as low as possible and efficiently buy the incidents and risk reduction, so your team can either spend that remaining time or reduce the cost of the security team.

Tools to help you optimize your alert budget

You can improve your alert budget in two key ways:

Better signal

If a team needs to handle a smaller number of alerts to “buy” the same outcome, it allows for better budget use. High-signal, low-noise — attempts to send meaningful alerts should thus be a priority. 

Make alerts easier

Making alerts faster to handle increases efficiency. There are a few ways to do this, including:

  • Include the relevant context in the alert. If the security person needs to take the alert and look up the necessary context to decide if it’s a problem, they’ve used some of their time budget. Ideally the security person should be able to immediately differentiate between high- and low-priority alerts directly within the notification. From there, the path to more information should be clear.
  • Make the alert easy to read. Clarity is always a challenge within the context of security, but it’s key to providing teams with the tools they need to do their jobs. This doesn’t necessarily mean a longer alert — but it does mean a more effective one.
  • Build effective relationships between security analysts and systems teams. When teams that manage a system know that security analysts quickly need help it’s possible to cut down on extra communication cycles. Teams should use whatever collaboration tools are already in their arsenal — do not change ticketing systems — and that they’re investing in building interpersonal relationships. Organizations can do this by supporting security team outings, sending swag and more. 

Managing your alert budget is supporting your security team

I once was on a team that wanted to hire more security people than the volume of experts that literally existed in the world at the time. The field of cybersecurity is severely understaffed, so I know from experience that time limitations are a very real issue. Proactively managing an alert budget — a robust system where time and alerts are tracked — can make or break success for security teams (which are often made up of scrappy experts forced to get creative with their problem-solving skills no matter how well-resourced their companies are). We need to support those teams to avoid burnout. Luckily, managing your alert budget with better signal and easier alerts can ensure that your team is still operating at full capacity — and not losing their mind in the process. 

https://www.securitymagazine.com/blogs/14-security-blog/post/100664-understanding-the-alert-budget-a-security-teams-second-ledger




Microsoft rilascia fix per 61 vulnerabilità di cui due già sfruttate


Nell’ultimo aggiornamento di sicurezza, Microsoft ha rilasciato i fix per 61 vulnerabilità; tra queste, due risultano sfruttate attivamente dagli attaccanti.

La CVE-2024-30040 è un bug di security bypass che colpisce Windows MSHTML Platform, il browser engine proprietario della compagnia usato per renderizzare le pagine web. A causa di una validazione errata degli input, la vulnerabilità consente a un attaccante di bypassare i controlli di sicurezza ed eseguire codice sulla macchina nel contesto dell’utente. Per sfruttare il bug l’attaccante deve convincere la vittima a scaricare e manipolare un file malevolo sul sistema.

L’altra vulnerabilità zero-day è la CVE-2024-30051, un bug che consente a un attaccante di ottenere i privilegi di SYSTEM sulla macchina colpita ed eseguire codice. La vulnerabilità, un heap-based buffer overflow, colpisce la DWM Core Library, la libreria principale del Desktop Window Manager, responsabile degli effetti grafici del sistema operativo.

Gli attaccanti stanno già sfruttando attivamente le due vulnerabilità; la seconda, in particolare, è stata usata in combinazione con il malware QakBot a partire da aprile, come riportato dai ricercatori di SecureList di Kaspersky.

Microsoft sicurezza

Nel report dei fix di Microsoft non si segnalano vulnerabilità critiche, ma tra i bug della lista ce ne sono 7 a criticità elevata. Oltre alla prima vulnerabilità già segnalata ci sono la CVE-2024-30010 e la CVE-2024-30017 che colpiscono Hyper-V e consentono entrambe l’esecuzione remota di codice. Individuati anche un bug in WDAC OLE DB provider per SQL che consente di eseguire codice remoto nel contesto del client SQL utente, e una vulnerabilità di elevation of privilege nel Brokering File System.

Il Routing and Remote Access Service, usato per creare applicazioni che amministrano il routing e l’accesso remoto al SO, soffre anch’esso di una vulnerabilità di esecuzione remota di codice dovuta a un errore di troncamento remoto. Infine, anche il servizio SharePoint Server Remote presenta un bug di esecuzione remota di codice, in questo caso causata dalla deserializzazione di dati untrusted.

Le patch sono disponibili per il download. Il consiglio è, come sempre, di aggiornare il prima possibile i prodotti vulnerabili con gli update del vendor.

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L’evoluzione del Vulnerability Assessment nell’Era Moderna della Cybersecurity. Abbiamo incontrato 7Layers

Fin dai tempi antichi, al fine di poter evolvere e migliorarsi, è necessario conoscere se stessi e tale prassi è applicabile anche al settore della sicurezza informatica: conoscere e gestire le vulnerabilità di sicurezza informatica rappresenta una sfida cruciale per le organizzazioni oggi e se già da tempo le attività di Vulnerability Assessment sono incluse nel macrocosmo della cybersecurity, oggi con la rapida evoluzione del panorama delle minacce informatiche le azioni non solo di Vulnerabiliy Assessment (VA) ma anche di Penetration Test (PT) risultano fondamentali per poter identificare, classificare e valutare correttamente le vulnerabilità dei sistemi in uso dall’azienda ottenendo anche una visione complessiva e dinamica delle potenziali superfici d’attacco.

Cosa sono il Vulnerability Assessment e il Penetration Test e le loro evoluzioni?

Il VA/PT, nella sua accezione più ampia, è un complesso di attività e processi che mirano a identificare, analizzare e classificare le vulnerabilità presenti nei sistemi informatici di un’organizzazione, in un processo continuo di analisi che ha come scope (ambito) differenti aree:

  • Physical: Concentrato sulla sicurezza fisica degli ambienti.
  • Network-Based: Rivolto alle vulnerabilità della rete.
  • Application-Based: Rivolto alle applicazioni software.
  • API-Based: Focalizzato sulle interfacce di programmazione delle applicazioni.
  • Host-Based: Riguarda i singoli dispositivi all’interno della rete.

Per poter ottenere, quindi, la piena visibilità di tutti i punti deboli dell’infrastruttura che un attaccante potrebbe voler sfruttare, non si tratta di svolgere una sola e singola attività di analisi su uno specifico ambito, ma di svolgere una azione periodica e trasversale su tutti gli ambiti sopra indicati, attraverso un lavoro costante.

Un recente progresso in questo campo consiste nel Risk-Based Vulnerability Management (RBVM), un approccio alla gestione delle vulnerabilità che va oltre la semplice identificazione e classificazione della vulnerabilità: il RBVM ha come elemento cardine la quantificazione del rischio di una vulnerabilità in relazione al reale rischio che questa costituisce per l’organizzazione.

A differenza dei tradizionali metodi di gestione delle vulnerabilità, che si basano sulla sola attribuzione di un punteggio di rischio dipendente dalla vulnerabilità senza contesto, l’RBVM utilizza metriche specifiche di contesto, come ad esempio il CVSS scores nei suo parametri completi, analizza l’attività dell’attaccante e la criticità dell’asset e adotta strumenti come il Vulnerability Prioritization Tool (VPT) per prioritizzare le vulnerabilità. L’obiettivo è concentrare gli sforzi di mitigazione e remediation sulle vulnerabilità con il più alto potenziale di danno per l’organizzazione: per poter ottenere questo risultato, tale approccio richiede l’integrazione di threat intelligence, l’analisi del contesto aziendale e le valutazioni tecniche allo scopo di produrre una roadmap di risposta efficace e tempestiva.

La gestione degli incidenti informatici, stante la metodologia consolidata, prevede diverse fasi:

  • identificazione;
  • analisi;
  • valutazione;
  • mitigazione e reporting.

Il primo punto, l’identificazione, ha come elemento cardine proprio l’attività di VA/PT, grazie alla quale è possibile rilevare, analizzare e valutare le minacce cyber conseguenti, permettendo ai team di sicurezza di prendere decisioni consapevoli tramite i dati acquisiti e consentendo una risposta rapida, scalabile e adattabile a fronte di un attacco.

Una ulteriore ricaduta dell’attività di VA/PT è l’acquisizione di insights sui sistemi aziendali, informazioni cruciali per l’analisi della conformità ai protocolli/framework normativi, estendo la mera verifica della sicurezza all’aderenza ai regolamentazioni in vigore.

L’importanza dell’Attack Surface Management

L’Attack Surface Management (ASM) è cruciale nell’era digitale avanzata data la complessa tessitura di componenti fisici e digitali nelle organizzazioni: con l’esplosione di dispositivi IoT e l’adozione pervasiva del cloud, la superficie d’attacco è aumentata esponenzialmente.

Nel 2022, Gartner identifica l’espansione della superficie di attacco come una priorità assoluta rispetto alla gestione della sicurezza: ciò pone sotto osservazione il limite dell’approccio EASM (External Attack Surface Management), che pur essendo essenziale, offre solo una visione parziale, limitata alle minacce esterne. Al contrario l’ASM (Attack Surface Management), con il suo approccio globale che include anche l’Attack Surface Assessment (ASA) e il Vulnerability Assessment e Penetratione Test, mira ad una protezione completa sotto i vari punti di vista.

L’ASM (Attack Surface Management) comprende ogni processo funzionale al monitoraggio costante e dinamico di tutte le potenziali debolezze sfruttabili per un attacco, al fine di garantire la difesa dalle minacce esterne senza tuttavia trascurare le possibili fonti di rischio interne, come ad esempio la presenza di dispositivi obsoleti, una scarsa protezione degli endpoint, una debolezza nella catena di fornitura o tentativi di social engineering mirati ai dipendenti meno preparati e più facilmente aggirabili.

Sul fronte delle tecnologie impiegate, questa esigenza si traduce nella crescente automazione delle varie attività di analisi del traffico di rete e di anomaly detection nonché, in caso di eventuali attacchi, dell’attuazione delle remediation necessarie e l’acquisizione dei dati derivanti dal reporting secondo il paradigma della lesson learned.

Un valido programma di ASM deve altresì comprendere la riduzione ai minimi termini, ove possibile, dei potenziali punti di accesso ai sistemi aziendali tramite il ricorso alla valutazione dei rischi annessi e deve prevedere l’analisi e l’applicazione del concetto di network segmentation, unitamente al continuo aggiornamento di tutte le risorse umane o tecnologiche coinvolte.

Il futuro dell’ASM: Vulnerability Assessment-as-a-service

Al fine di fronteggiare validamente il rischio cyber, oggi le organizzazioni devono imparare a gestire l’intero vulnerability life cycle in maniera coerente con le priorità aziendali.

Ciò è particolarmente urgente per le numerose realtà che negli ultimi anni hanno optato per un ricorso stabile al lavoro ibrido: infrastrutture diffuse e reti a cui il personale accede da remoto hanno infatti ulteriormente sfumato i confini fisici e dilatato il perimetro digitale dell’azienda, rendendo meno semplice l’applicazione di uniformi politiche di patching sui dispositivi o la piena implementazione del paradigma Zero Trust nella gestione degli accessi.

La ricerca, l’esame e la valutazione di tutte le potenziali vulnerabilità possibili, presenti sui sistemi aziendali, risulta per buona parte delle organizzazioni un compito gravoso se svolto con le risorse interne, motivo per cui il trend sempre più consolidato è quello del ricorso, da parte delle organizzazioni, di servizi di Vulnerability-as-a-Service (VaaS) in outsourcing: se le attività tecnologiche e le analisi dal punto di vista di un attaccante sono svolte da soggetti terzi, l’organizzazione mantiene la gestione dei flussi di Digital Risk Protection Services (DRPS), Cyber asset attack surface management (CAASM) ed External attack surface management (EASM) entro un unico processo di Cybersecurity Validation che garantisca – in attuazione del principio noto come Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) – una gestione della sicurezza dinamica e integrata, in grado di contenere e anticipare l’evoluzione vertiginosa delle minacce informatiche.

Durante il nostro incontro con la Business Unit di sicurezza offensiva di 7Layers, è emersa una considerazione cruciale: in un’epoca in cui le minacce informatiche sono in costante evoluzione, è fondamentale avere una chiara comprensione del proprio panorama di vulnerabilità e adottare un approccio proattivo alla loro gestione per garantire la sicurezza di ogni organizzazione.

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https://www.ictsecuritymagazine.com/notizie/levoluzione-del-vulnerability-assessment-nellera-moderna-della-cybersecurity-abbiamo-incontrato-7layers/




Meta is the second most spoofed brand for credential phishing

A report by Cofense examines the inner workings of a sophisticated phishing campaign, one that can bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) in order to target Meta business accounts. The report reveals the existence of a cybercrime toolkit allowing malicious actors to create links, emails and other deployable tools. Currently, this campaign can create phishing emails in various languages and directed at 19 countries. 

These emails appear to originate from Meta, claiming that the targeted account infringed upon copyright or violated another rule. If the campaign succeeds, then the followers of the targeted business account may be at risk of targeted attacks such as malicious ads. 

Key findings from the report include: 

  • Based on credential phishing emails in 2024, Meta is the second most spoofed brand. The most spoofed brand is Microsoft. 
  • A notable amount of these phishing emails in enterprise environments are protected by secure email gateways (SEGs). 
  • The infrastructure involved in the campaign includes an ability create Netlify App links, a tool that checks if links are live, an indicators of compromise list and data on targets/financial profits. 

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100662-meta-is-the-second-most-spoofed-brand-for-credential-phishing




SSH backdoor has infected 400,000 Linux servers over 15 years and keeps on spreading

A cartoon door leads to a wall of computer code.

Infrastructure used to maintain and distribute the Linux operating system kernel was infected for two years, starting in 2009, by sophisticated malware that managed to get a hold of one of the developers’ most closely guarded resources: the /etc/shadow files that stored encrypted password data for more than 550 system users, researchers said Tuesday.

The unknown attackers behind the compromise infected at least four servers inside kernel.org, the Internet domain underpinning the sprawling Linux development and distribution network, the researchers from security firm ESET said. After obtaining the cryptographic hashes for 551 user accounts on the network, the attackers were able to convert half into plaintext passwords, likely through password-cracking techniques and the use of an advanced credential-stealing feature built into the malware. From there, the attackers used the servers to send spam and carry out other nefarious activities. The four servers were likely infected and disinfected at different times, with the last two being remediated at some point in 2011.

Stealing kernel.org’s keys to the kingdom

An infection of kernel.org came to light in 2011, when kernel maintainers revealed that 448 accounts had been compromised after attackers had somehow managed to gain unfettered, or “root,” system access to servers connected to the domain. Maintainers reneged on a promise to provide an autopsy of the hack, a decision that has limited the public’s understanding of the incident.

Besides revealing the number of compromised user accounts, representatives of the Linux Kernel Organization provided no details other than saying that the infection:

  • Occurred no later than August 12, 2011, and wasn’t detected for another 17 days
  • Installed an off-the-shelf rootkit known as Phalanx on multiple servers and personal devices belonging to a senior Linux developer
  • Modified the files that both servers and end user devices inside the network used to connect through OpenSSH, an implementation of the SSH protocol for securing remote connections.

In 2014, ESET researchers said the 2011 attack likely infected kernel.org servers with a second piece of malware they called Ebury. The malware, the firm said, came in the form of a malicious code library that, when installed, created a backdoor in OpenSSH that provided the attackers with a remote root shell on infected hosts with no valid password required. In a little less than 22 months, starting in August 2011, Ebury spread to 25,000 servers. Besides the four belonging to the Linux Kernel Organization, the infection also touched one or more servers inside hosting facilities and an unnamed domain registrar and web hosting provider.

A 47-page report summarizing Ebury’s 15-year history said that the infection hitting the kernel.org network began in 2009, two years earlier than the domain was previously thought to have been compromised. The report said that since 2009, the OpenSSH-dwelling malware has infected more than 400,000 servers, all running Linux except for about 400 FreeBSD servers, a dozen OpenBSD and SunOS servers, and at least one Mac.

Researcher Marc-Etienne M. Léveillé wrote:

In our 2014 paper, we mentioned that there was evidence that kernel.org, hosting the source code of the Linux kernel, had been a victim of Ebury. Data now at our disposal reveals additional details about the incident. Ebury had been installed on at least four servers belonging to the Linux Foundation between 2009 and 2011. It seems these servers acted as mail servers, name servers, mirrors, and source code repositories at the time of the compromise. We cannot tell for sure when Ebury was removed from each of the servers, but since it was discovered in 2011 it is likely that two of the servers were compromised for as long as two years, one for one year and the other for six months.

The perpetrator also had copies of the /etc/shadow files, which overall contained 551 unique username and hashed password pairs. The cleartext passwords for 275 of those users (50%) are in possession of the attackers. We believe that the cleartext passwords were obtained by using the installed Ebury credential stealer, and by brute force.

The researcher said in an email that the Ebury and Phalanx infections appear to be separate compromises by two unrelated threat groups. Representatives of the Linux Kernel Organization didn’t respond to emails asking if they were aware of the ESET report or if its claims were accurate. There is no indication that either infection resulted in tampering with the Linux kernel source code.

https://arstechnica.com/?p=2024591