CISA shares resources to bolster election security for 2024 primaries

With the 2024 election cycle in full swing, a complex threat landscape emerges. Election officials and election infrastructure will face new challenges, making it all the more important that the election process is secure and resilient. 

In order to bolster election security, the CISA has made easily accessible election security resources. This hub of resources is referred to as #Protect2024, and it is designed to be a one-stop location for accessing CISA security services, training resources and best practices. It also hosts a collection of security guidelines that cover cyber, physical and operational threats and risks that election infrastructure may face. 

The CISA has also taken measures to meet election officials where they are. These measures include adjusting support efforts to meet a jurisdiction’s needs, placing election security advisors across the nation and expanding field staff. 

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100495-cisa-shares-resources-to-bolster-election-security-for-2024-primaries




78% of MSPs state cybersecurity is a prominent IT challenge

A report by Kaseya reveals that cybersecurity is at the forefront of managed service providers’ minds, including IT professionals and executives. The report discovered that 78% of MSPs consider cybersecurity to be their greatest challenge. This is an increase from the previous year, in which 67% listed cybersecurity as their greatest challenge. This emphasizes the need for organizations to invest in innovative cybersecurity solutions and talent in order to secure against emerging threats. The importance of cybersecurity is evident to MSPs, as 73% state that it is one of their top revenue drivers. 

The report also depicts cyberattack trends in regard to small and medium-sized businesses. The surveyed MSPs report that they have observed fewer cyberattacks against small and medium-sized businesses, which the report attributes to proper security measures taken by those businesses. Over half of the surveyed MSPs (64%) report that 10% or less of their small and medium-sized business customers faced a cyberattack within the year. 

Cybersecurity is a prevalent concern for small and medium-sized businesses as well, as 46% of MSPs report that their customers request information on cybersecurity and best practices. 

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100496-78-of-msps-state-cybersecurity-is-a-prominent-it-challenge




Strengthening national infrastructure resilience

The current landscape of critical infrastructure organizations is undergoing a paradigm shift, characterized by dynamic workforce structures that include remote, hybrid and diverse work settings, alongside generational transformations. However, this shift presents a formidable challenge — the persistent and escalating threat of insider attacks. Reports estimating the cost per insider threat incident at over $15 million underscore the urgency for a broad and thorough approach encompassing prevention, mitigation, investigation and reporting mechanisms.

Drawing parallels with ancient strategies like the Trojan horse used by the Greeks to infiltrate Troy, the evolution of insider threats in the modern era spans a spectrum, ranging from malicious insiders with ulterior motives to negligent employees and disgruntled former staff. The repercussions of insider threats are far-reaching, encompassing data breaches, trade secret theft, operational disruptions, regulatory penalties and severe damage to organizational reputation and trust.

Given their role in national security and public welfare, critical infrastructure entities are particularly vulnerable to insider threats. The potential consequences of an insider attack extend beyond financial losses, including service disruptions, compromised operational integrity and even public safety hazards. Safeguarding critical infrastructure against insider threats necessitates a proactive, holistic approach that addresses vulnerabilities across physical, digital and human domains to recognize keys to prevention and mitigation.

Understanding key indicators and prevention

In an ever-changing environment, organizations must remain vigilant by identifying key indicators of insider threats, such as anomalous behavior patterns, unauthorized access attempts and irregular data transfer activities. Creating a culture of transparency and accountability is fundamental to effective threat mitigation. Establishing clear channels for reporting suspicious activities, coupled with non-retaliatory policies, encourages employees to proactively flag potential threats. Regular awareness training programs empower staff members to recognize signs of insider threats, fostering a proactive approach to prevention and is an important element of protection.

Enacted in 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) represents a pivotal step towards fortifying the resilience of critical infrastructure. It emphasizes robust governance frameworks, stringent audit mechanisms, proactive prosecution of offenders, inter-agency collaboration and whistleblower protection initiatives. With underreporting prevalent, a preemptive prevention strategy assumes paramount importance. Implementing stringent access controls, conducting periodic risk assessments and fostering a culture of security consciousness serve as defenses against potential breaches.

Recognizing the pivotal role of whistleblowers in early threat detection, organizations must institute mechanisms to safeguard individuals who come forward with concerns. PPD-21’s provisions for whistleblower protection serve as a blueprint for creating an environment where employees feel emboldened to report suspicious activities without fear of reprisal, contributing to the effort to mitigate damage.

Advanced monitoring technologies and threat intelligence sharing

Leveraging state-of-the-art monitoring technologies, such as behavior analytics and machine learning algorithms, enhances an organization’s ability to detect subtle deviations indicative of insider threats. Real-time monitoring, anomaly detection and predictive analytics enable proactive threat mitigation and response. Establishing collaborative networks for sharing threat intelligence facilitates the dissemination of actionable insights across critical infrastructure sectors. By pooling resources, expertise and threat data, organizations can bolster their collective defense posture and preempt potential attacks.

Beyond conventional training initiatives, organizations should prioritize continuous education and skill development programs. Interactive workshops, tabletop exercises and simulated scenarios provide employees with the required knowledge, skills and situational awareness to stop insider threats effectively. Developing a robust incident response framework tailored to the nuances of insider threats is essential. This entails delineating clear escalation protocols, communication channels and coordination mechanisms to orchestrate a swift, coordinated response in the event of an incident.

Insider threat risk assessments, innovation, and collaboration

Conducting regular risk assessments specific to insider threats enables organizations to identify latent vulnerabilities and proactively mitigate potential risks. Comprehensive assessments should encompass physical, cyber and personnel-related dimensions to provide a holistic understanding of the threat landscape. In the face of evolving insider threats, technological innovations play a pivotal role in fortifying an organization’s defense mechanisms. Implementing innovative solutions, such as advanced cybersecurity tools, artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, can significantly enhance threat detection capabilities. These technologies enable organizations to move beyond reactive measures, adopting proactive strategies that identify potential insider threats before they escalate.

Ensuring legal and regulatory compliance is integral to a comprehensive insider threat mitigation strategy. Organizations must not only adhere to existing directives like PPD-21 but also stay abreast of evolving regulatory landscapes. Compliance not only protects organizations from legal ramifications but also serves as a benchmark for establishing robust security practices. In an interconnected world, collaboration within the critical infrastructure sector is indispensable. Establishing strategic partnerships and information-sharing platforms among industry players enhances collective resilience. Collaborative efforts can include joint research initiatives, sharing threat intelligence and participating in simulated exercises to test response capabilities. 

Recognizing the impact of workplace stress, job dissatisfaction and burnout on the potential for insider threats, organizations should consider implementing employee wellness programs. Fostering a positive work environment, providing mental health resources and addressing workplace concerns can contribute to a more engaged and satisfied workforce, reducing the likelihood of disgruntled employees resorting to malicious activities solely or in collusion with outsiders.

As the landscape of insider threats continues to evolve, critical infrastructure organizations must adopt an expansive and forward-thinking approach to safeguard against potential risks. Embracing proactive prevention strategies, fostering a culture of transparency and investing in advanced technologies and continuous employee training initiatives are critical steps. Compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, strategic industry collaboration and holistic employee wellness programs further fortify an organization’s defenses. By integrating these multifaceted strategies, critical infrastructure entities not only protect themselves from potential threats but also contribute to the broader resilience and security of national infrastructure. In the ever-evolving realm of insider threats, a comprehensive strategy is not merely a choice but a necessity.

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100473-strengthening-national-infrastructure-resilience




CERT-AGID 02 – 08 Marzo 2024: un’impennata di minacce porta a 234 indicatori di compromissione


La settimana appena trascorsa ha messo a dura prova il CERT-AGID, che dal 2 all’8 marzo ha rilevato ed esaminato ben 25 attività dannose all’interno dei confini italiani, superando le 16 registrate la settimana precedente.

Di queste, 22 erano specificatamente dirette contro obiettivi italiani (contro le 12 della settimana anteriore), mentre le restanti 3, pur essendo di natura più generale, hanno interessato ugualmente l’Italia.

Come misura di contrasto a questi attacchi, il CERT-AGID ha fornito 234 indicatori di compromissione (IOC), segnando un significativo aumento dai 143 del periodo precedente. Di seguito, ecco una sintesi delle principali minacce.

Andamento settimanale

Durante l’ultima settimana, sono emersi 10 temi principali tramite i quali si sono diffuse operazioni malevole in Italia. Il comparto bancario è il più colpito, con 8 azioni che lo hanno reso il principale obiettivo di tentativi di phishing e smishing contro le banche del paese. Questo settore ha inoltre subito due aggressioni mirate a diffondere il malware Irata su dispositivi Android.

Segue il tema dei Rinnovi, con quattro azioni malevole, utilizzato prevalentemente nelle operazioni di phishing legate ad Aruba.

Gli Avvisi di Sicurezza, legati alla campagna di phishing Adattivo ulteriormente perfezionata, insieme ai temi Ordine e Prestazioni (legate alle campagne di smishing dell’INPS), Resend e Pagamenti, sono stati impiegati in due occasioni.

Infine, le tematiche Delivery, Contratti e Aggiornamenti hanno caratterizzato una singola campagna ciascuna.

Fonte: CERT AGID

Malware della settimana

Nell’ambito della sicurezza informatica italiana, questa settimana sono state particolarmente evidenti 6 distinte famiglie di malware che hanno portato avanti diverse campagne malevole.

In particolare, si sono distinte due campagne legate al malware Formbook, una specificamente italiana e l’altra di portata più ampia, incentrate sui temi “Pagamenti” e “Delivery”, veicolate attraverso email con allegati in formato RAR e R01.

Analogamente, AgentTesla è stato al centro di due operazioni, una mirata agli utenti italiani e l’altra di carattere generale, focalizzate rispettivamente su “Pagamenti” e “Ordine, e veicolate tramite email con allegati RAR e IMG.

Per quanto riguarda il malware Irata, sono state contrastate due iniziative a tema Banking, diffuse mediante SMS e contenenti link per il download di un APK dannoso.

Remcos ha fatto la sua comparsa in una campagna italiana legata a “Ordine”, diffusa attraverso email con allegati 7Z. Pikabot è stato identificato in un’azione italiana associata al tema “Resend”, mediante email con allegati ISO che nascondevano un file eseguibile EXE.

Infine, Wikiloader ha caratterizzato una campagna di ampio raggio sul tema “Pagamenti”, tramite email che includevano allegati PDF con link a file ZIP. Da questi, si estraeva un file JS che, a sua volta, rimandava a un file ZIP ospitato su Discord, dal quale si otteneva una DLL dannosa.

Fonte: CERT AGID

Phishing della settimana

Questa settimana, 11 brand sono stati coinvolti in campagne di phishing e smishing. Tra questi hanno suscitato particolare attenzione le operazioni riguardanti l’INPS e una campagna adattiva che ha visto un’ulteriore evoluzione.

I formati e i canali di diffusione

Nell’arco dell’ultima settimana, nove differenti tipologie di file sono state selezionate per veicolare attacchi informatici. I file RAR, PDF e APK sono stati impiegati due volte ciascuno, mentre formati quali 7Z, ISO, R01, IMG, ZIP e JS hanno trovato applicazione una singola volta ciascuno.

Riguardo ai canali di diffusione, due sono stati i metodi prevalenti: l’email ha avuto un ruolo predominante, venendo utilizzata in 19 occasioni, mentre gli SMS sono stati adoperati 6 volte.

Fonte: CERT AGID

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Adversarial Machine Learning, il report del NIST

Il National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) ha pubblicato un nuovo report dal titolo “AI 100-2 E2023 – Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations”.

Il documento è dedicato al fenomeno dell’AML, citato come minaccia emergente anche nelle Linee Guida per lo sviluppo sicuro dei sistemi AI messe a punto dall’UK National Cyber Security Centre e dall’US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency insieme a numerose Agenzie nazionali per la sicurezza informatica, tra cui l’italiana ACN.

Con questa intensa attività regolatoria, che ha visto anche il recente aggiornamento alla versione 2.0 del suo Cybersecurity Framework, l’agenzia statunitense sta tentando di ridefinire il quadro internazionale degli standard tecnologici alla luce dell’evoluzione dirompente a cui va soggetta la materia.

AI e AML: le definizioni

Il report del NIST afferma in via preliminare che ogni sistema AI “include – at a minimum – the data, model, and processes for training, testing, and deploying the machine learning (ML) models and the infrastructure required for using them”.

Per i concetti di “security, resilience, and robustness of ML systems” si rimanda invece alle definizioni già contenute nel NIST AI Risk Management Framework.

Su tale base di riferimento si specifica come gli ambienti AI/ML comportino, rispetto a quelli più tradizionali, ulteriori sfide in termini di sicurezza e protezione dati; includendo il rischio di “adversarial manipulation of training data, adversarial exploitation of model vulnerabilities to adversely affect the performance of the AI system, and even malicious manipulations, modifications or mere interaction with models to exfltrate sensitive information about people represented in the data, about the model itself, or proprietary enterprise data”.

L’AML viene pertanto definito come l’illecita manipolazione dei dati o dei modelli sottostanti ai sistemi basati su Machine Learning e Intelligenza Artificiale, al fine di esfiltrare informazioni sensibili relative a persone od organizzazioni.

Attacchi ai sistemi AI e buone pratiche di mitigazione

Ribadendo anzitutto la distinzione tra Predictive AI (PredAI) e Generative AI (GenAI), il NIST evidenzia che questa seconda “classe” d’Intelligenza Artificiale oggi permea tanto l’economia digitale quanto la vita quotidiana, particolarmente in conseguenza della diffusione di strumenti che impiegano Large Language Models (LLMs).

Dopo le citate premesse terminologiche il documento espone le principali metodologie di attacchi informatici contro tali sistemi, in cui sono state osservate frequenti violazioni della sicurezza “through the public APIs that expose the model, and against the platforms on which they are deployed”.

La “tassonomia” degli schemi di attacco è suddivisa come segue:

  • “evasion, poisoning, and privacy attacks for PredAI systems,
  • evasion, poisoning, privacy, and abuse attacks for GenAI systems,
  • attacks against all viable learning methods (e.g., supervised, unsupervised, semi-supervised, federated learning, reinforcement learning) across multiple data modalities”, comprensivi degli attacchi rivolti all’AI Supply Chain.

All’analisi di ciascun gruppo di attacchi segue la sintesi delle possibili azioni di mitigazione – che spaziano dall’Adversarial training a nuovi paradigmi, quale la Differential Privacy (DP) – sempre accompagnate dalla precisazione per cui, trattandosi di un campo in rapidissima espansione, nessuna soluzione sia da ritenersi stabile o definitiva.

Il report termina con un Glossario che fornisce definizioni aggiornate delle parole chiave più comuni, al fine di contribuire a diffondere “common language and understanding for the rapidly developing AML landscape”.

A cura della Redazione

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https://www.ictsecuritymagazine.com/notizie/adversarial-machine-learning-il-report-del-nist/




Cybersecurity and the current skills gap

Even with increased automation, an organization’s cybersecurity strategy is only as strong as its employees. According to a Fortinet report, 84% of surveyed security leaders experienced one or more breaches in the past 12 months, up from 80% in 2021. Twenty-nine percent had five or more intrusions versus 19% the previous year, and 48% suffered breaches in the past 12 months that cost more than $1 million to remediate, up from 38% in 2021.

The report found that 81% of cyberattacks were in the form of phishing, password and malware attacks. Sixty-five percent of the survey respondents expect the number of cyberattacks to increase. North American respondents expect a 25% increase in attacks over the next year. Respondents in Europe, the Middle East and Africa expect a slightly lower increase at 17%. Because of this, organizations are looking for ways to increase their cybersecurity preparedness. This includes communicating with executives and attempting to hire additional security personnel, since 68% of organizations indicate they face additional risks because of cybersecurity skills shortages.

Ninety-three percent of respondents indicate their board asks about cybersecurity, up from 88% in 2021. In 2022, 83% of boards suggested increasing IT security headcount, compared to 76% in 2021. The report found that 93% of leaders believe their organization is doing everything it can to deal with increasing attack volumes.

One of the ways organizations are working towards this is by hiring based on security certifications. Ninety percent of leaders prefer to hire individuals with technology-focused certifications. Eighty-two percent indicate that their organization would benefit from cybersecurity training in the form of certifications, and 75% indicate that their organization would benefit from security awareness and training for all employees.

Nearly all leaders (95%) with certifications themselves or who have a certified employee on their team have experienced positive results. Seventy-two percent indicate increased cybersecurity knowledge and 62% indicate better performance of duties. Fifty-five percent indicate that certification has sped up their career growth, and 47% indicate higher salaries, up from 29% in 2021.

In addition to looking for certifications, security leaders have worked to increase diversity within the field. Approximately 40% of respondents report difficulty finding qualified candidates who are women, military veterans, or from minority backgrounds. Eighty-three percent of organizations have near-term diversity hiring goals, down from 89% in 2021. Thirty-seven percent of respondents indicate network security roles are hardest to fill, while 32% indicate software development roles are hardest to fill. The majority (54%) indicate retention is also a challenge.

Find out more here.

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100492-cybersecurity-and-the-current-skills-gap




Top threats concerning chief security officers

As security leaders know, the threat landscape is constantly evolving. As social, economic and political situations change, organizations must face the threats and risks that follow. The current threats concerning chief security officers (CSOs) in 2023 were analyzed in a recent report by Allied Universal.

The report found that 47% of CSOs cited economic unrest as a concern in the coming 12 months. Ninety percent of respondents said cyber threats that threaten physical security systems are challenging to operations, and 88% of chief security officers said company leaders are more concerned with cybersecurity than physical security threats.

CSOs anticipate that economic unrest will be the greatest security-impacting hazard to affect their operations over the next 12 months, cited by 47% of respondents. Thirty-five percent of CSOs anticipate a threat in the next year, up from 31% in the last 12 months. There is also an increase in threats expected from disruption of energy supplies. According to the report, the threat from war and political instability is also likely to increase, with 32% anticipating a threat, up from 25% in the last year.

Climate change is expected to be the second most likely security-impacting hazard, reported by 38% of participants in the next 12 months. More than one-third (34%) of CSOs confirmed their company has experienced a security hazard due to climate change.

Pandemics were cited by 42% of respondents as biggest security-impacting hazard last year, a hazard that is expected to recede in the next year. It is the hazard that most correlates with implementing more effective security — meaning it was the hazard most likely to drive companies to improve their security, according to the report.

The report found that people skills in frontline security professionals are more important than physical attributes of strength for nine out of 10 respondents. Global companies recognize the value of highly skilled and intelligent security professionals protecting their most important assets, with 94% saying the ability to speak multiple languages and 96% saying a higher education degree are important for a frontline security professional.

Twenty-five percent of publicly-listed companies reported a drop in value following an external or internal security incident over the last year. The two threat actor groups that caused the most security incidents over the previous 12 months were subversives — hackers, protestors, or spies — and economic criminals, where 39% of respondents reported experiencing threats from both groups.

Nine in 10 respondents said their company experienced some form of internal threat in the last year.

Find out more here.

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100490-top-threats-concerning-chief-security-officers




Microsoft says Kremlin-backed hackers accessed its source and internal systems

Microsoft says Kremlin-backed hackers accessed its source and internal systems

Microsoft said that Kremlin-backed hackers who breached its corporate network in January have expanded their access since then in follow-on attacks that are targeting customers and have compromised the company’s source code and internal systems.

The intrusion, which the software company disclosed in January, was carried out by Midnight Blizzard, the name used to track a hacking group widely attributed to the Federal Security Service, a Russian intelligence agency. Microsoft said at the time that Midnight Blizzard gained access to senior executives’ email accounts for months after first exploiting a weak password in a test device connected to the company’s network. Microsoft went on to say it had no indication any of its source code or production systems had been compromised.

Secrets sent in email

In an update published Friday, Microsoft said it uncovered evidence that Midnight Blizzard had used the information it gained initially to further push into its network and compromise both source code and internal systems. The hacking group—which is tracked under multiple other names, including APT29, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke, The Dukes, Dark Halo, and Nobelium—has been using the proprietary information in follow-on attacks, not only against Microsoft but also its customers.

“In recent weeks, we have seen evidence that Midnight Blizzard is using information initially exfiltrated from our corporate email systems to gain, or attempt to gain, unauthorized access,” Friday’s update said. “This has included access to some of the company’s source code repositories and internal systems. To date we have found no evidence that Microsoft-hosted customer-facing systems have been compromised.

In January’s disclosure, Microsoft said Midnight Blizzard used a password-spraying attack to compromise a “legacy non-production test tenant account” on the company’s network. Those details meant that the account hadn’t been removed once it was decommissioned, a practice that’s considered essential for securing networks. The details also meant that the password used to log in to the account was weak enough to be guessed by sending a steady stream of credentials harvested from previous breaches—a technique known as password spraying.

In the months since, Microsoft said Friday, Midnight Blizzard has been exploiting the information it obtained earlier in follow-on attacks that have stepped up an already high rate of password spraying.

Unprecedented global threat

Microsoft officials wrote:

It is apparent that Midnight Blizzard is attempting to use secrets of different types it has found. Some of these secrets were shared between customers and Microsoft in email, and as we discover them in our exfiltrated email, we have been and are reaching out to these customers to assist them in taking mitigating measures. Midnight Blizzard has increased the volume of some aspects of the attack, such as password sprays, by as much as 10-fold in February, compared to the already large volume we saw in January 2024.

Midnight Blizzard’s ongoing attack is characterized by a sustained, significant commitment of the threat actor’s resources, coordination, and focus. It may be using the information it has obtained to accumulate a picture of areas to attack and enhance its ability to do so. This reflects what has become more broadly an unprecedented global threat landscape, especially in terms of sophisticated nation-state attacks.

The attack began in November and wasn’t detected until January. Microsoft said then that the breach allowed Midnight Blizzard to monitor the email accounts of senior executives and security personnel, raising the possibility that the group was able to read sensitive communications for as long as three months. Microsoft said one motivation for the attack was for Midnight Blizzard to learn what the company knew about the threat group. Microsoft said at the time and reiterated again Friday that it had no evidence the hackers gained access to customer-facing systems.

Midnight Blizzard is among the most prolific APTs, short for advanced persistent threats, the term used for skilled, well-funded hacking groups that are mostly backed by nation-states. The group was behind the SolarWinds supply-chain attack that led to the hacking of the US Departments of Energy, Commerce, Treasury, and Homeland Security and about 100 private-sector companies.

Last week, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and international partners warned that in recent months, the threat group has expanded its activity to target aviation, education, law enforcement, local and state councils, government financial departments, and military organizations.

https://arstechnica.com/?p=2008953




Cybersecurity trends and the evolution of the CISO in 2024

If there’s one constant in cybersecurity, it’s that security leaders embrace new opportunities — and confront unprecedented challenges — with each new year. Emerging technologies, new attack vectors and even geopolitical crises shape the day-to-day evolution of the chief information security officer’s job. 

In 2024, there will be no shortage of embracing the new for CISOs. Security leaders must contend with the application of artificial intelligence in both cyberattacks and defense; a U.S. election cycle with a major focus on election security and fraud prevention; a new SEC disclosure rule requiring publicly traded companies to report material incidents; and a global geopolitical environment fraught with conflicts.   

All of these factors bring risk and even fear to employees at their companies, customers, and customers’ customers. In 2024, CISOs must strive to build trust and confidence in the face of these uncertainties. 

Crypto comeback

The recent approval of Bitcoin ETFs has spurred cryptocurrency to significant gains in value, rising out of the trough of 2022. In 2021, when cryptomania gripped the globe, crypto-related theft and fraud skyrocketed. Once again, security leaders can expect to see new malware delivery that plants crypto miners, account takeovers at cloud service providers, and crypto-related “smash and grabs” where wallets left without the right protections end up being emptied. And the international groups fighting ransomware will stay very busy.

Add in the proliferation of cloud-based-GPUs driven by the expansion of generative AI, and there are a combination of factors that will lead to significant security challenges at the intersection of cryptocurrency value — especially when considering that GPUs are some of the most efficient pieces of hardware for mining and AI-produced content is often traded in crypto. 

AI friend or foe? 

From a cybersecurity and fraud perspective, AI has created an increasingly tricky environment. On a positive note, AI will likely complement security defenses by accelerating threat detection and response. On the other hand, AI can also be misappropriated to create even more sophisticated attack vectors, particularly in social engineering and fraud.

Fraudsters with access to cheap AI will perfect their English or other target-language grifts and become more successful at exploiting vulnerable populations like the elderly, poor, or internet users in developing countries. This will create big questions we must wrestle with as a society: Is maintaining safe use of AI the responsibility of its creators? How expensive will it be to maintain safety, and who will oversee it? Who pays for damaging fraud schemes?

Similar to other challenges in harmful content creation and content risk management, this will force CISOs to carefully navigate the risks and rewards that come from AI implementation. 

Geopolitical collateral damage

At the outset of each international conflict in recent years — primarily Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict — security leaders observed a surge in cyberattacks. Some of that was directly related to the wars, but much was driven by activist groups looking to influence political or military outcomes. 

It’s a trap for CISOs to assume that they have nothing to worry about if they aren’t part of a governmental or military supply chain.

Malware is often poorly targeted or intentionally broad to attempt to land at its final target, with little consideration for the potential of collateral damage. The ongoing conflicts, or potentially new ones in 2024, will continue to put pressure on CISOs to consider threat vectors beyond the immediate risk posture of their business. 

Election-year challenges

It’s been eight years since misinformation campaigns tainted the 2016 U.S. elections. And while the same tactics may not be directly employed this year, the 2024 election cycle will likely come with its own set of challenges. Are content platforms like ‘X’ ready to take on the responsibility of monitoring and managing disinformation or misinformation that could have a direct effect on an election? 

And that’s not all. Objectionable content, employee communications and customer relationships have all become part of the election-year business narrative. GenAI could amplify these challenges. Think that’s not a CISO’s concern? That’s worth reconsidering. Employee and customer trust are often a direct outcome for a CISO, and where cloud platforms are involved, trust has a much wider reach.

SEC material incident filings

In December 2023, the SEC gave CISOs something new to sweat over with its newly implemented rules that require businesses to report cybersecurity incidents that are material in nature within four business days. 

That means CISOs must be able to help determine materiality and all of the nuances that come with that one powerful word. That requires a strong understanding of how a business operates, markets itself and records and collects revenue. 

One outcome is that CISOs may increasingly find themselves working side-by-side with Chief Revenue Officers and Chief Marketing Officers in addition to their technology and finance counterparts. To be successful, a public company CISO must be able to translate the deep technical decisions they make into business outcomes around the customer lifecycle or product development.

Counteracting FUD with trust

If there’s one thing the internet is very good at, it’s spreading fear, uncertainty and doubt at an alarming rate. CISOs have a role in counteracting this force. In the face of a constant drumbeat of negativity, security leaders must exercise our strengths for positive change and outcomes. 

While risk posture may look different in 2024, it is no more dire than other points in modern history. CISOs must step into the role of a truly cross-functional and cultural leader within their companies to strengthen trust with employees and customers.

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100493-cybersecurity-trends-and-the-evolution-of-the-ciso-in-2024




DNS tunneling: How it’s evolved and four ways to reduce the risk

Attacks related to Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure have been on the rise and most organizations aren’t prepared for the onslaught. In fact, a recent report by Enterprise Management Associates (EMA) found that less than 31% of organizations are confident in their DNS security.

DNS is a component of many different cyberattacks, including ransomware, DNS-based distributed denial of service (DDoS) and DNS tunneling. In that same EMA survey, DNS tunneling was cited as the second-biggest concern organizations had when it came to the security of their DNS infrastructure. 

So, why is this so popular? And what can security leaders do to stop it?

The truth about DNS tunneling

Essentially, DNS tunneling is a methodology that encodes the data of other programs or protocols in DNS queries or responses. When used maliciously, it allows bad actors to establish a command-and-control channel to a victim’s computer and circumvent traditional digital defenses such as firewalls. In many cases, it’s possible to configure a firewall rule to detect DNS tunneling activity, but this is complicated and yields varying degrees of effectiveness, and it’s not typically done.

While tunneling is an older technique, it’s still popular for the primary reason that most people aren’t actively monitoring DNS. As an attack method, it’s been used for over a decade, but it’s grown in popularity within the past several years. That’s not terribly surprising considering that bad actors are almost always going to choose the simplest technique with the greatest track record of success. They’ll stick to the low-hanging fruit because it is simple, fast and reliable. Once it stops working, they will move on to the next low-hanging attack type. The shift to DNS abuse attacks, including DNS tunneling, were likely a response to the desire for simple and reliable results.

Even in a situation where you have a protective DNS solution that is blocking threats and responding, most organizations aren’t always looking at Port 53 as thoroughly as they should. And monitoring can slow web performance, which creates user satisfaction issues, as well as an avalanche of potential false positives.

DNS is an old, reliable system that was never designed with security as a priority in the first place. There are inherent weaknesses that make it an easy attack vector with a low cost of entry and a higher rate of return. Generative AI and machine learning are likely helping lower the barrier to entry, since bad actors no longer have to write the code themselves or have the technical know-how; they get help from these technologies. In the future machine learning will also aid in the prevention and detection of such attacks. So, for now, DNS attacks — including tunneling — are here to stay. The good news? There are ways to keep your organization protected from such attacks.

Why monitoring is crucial

As mentioned, many organizations aren’t monitoring their DNS traffic; they’re not locking it down at all. They’re not setting their firewalls, segmenting their networks or even following the best practices for network configurations. Organizations are often scared to use encrypted DNS for fear of breaking their internet access or slowing load times to unacceptable levels.

Monitoring is the key to overcoming the assault on DNS. For example, security leaders will be able to see if bad actors are exfiltrating a number of huge DNS requests that are maxing out and they’re chained right behind each other, all going to the same place. Similarly, if security leaders start seeing strange sizes or characters on the end of what looks like a normal domain, or even in the middle, they’ll know it’s time to investigate.

Best practices for bolstering DNS security

While the first step in increasing DNS security is to set up established monitoring on the DNS protocol, zero trust architecture is the next step. This framework can do a great job of mitigating risks like DNS tunneling. While it doesn’t keep information from being shared, it does keep the information from being passed internally. So, if you have a Zero Trust architecture and a number of web-facing assets, if they’re not talking to all your password managers, the password managers aren’t going to be sharing that information because they don’t have the access.

Next, put a process or solution in place for protecting against this particular style of attack. A protective DNS solution is one form of security; implementing something like DNS encryption tools would be another.

It’s important to be able to conduct behavior monitoring, looking at things like:

  • What’s your standard domain name length?
  • What are your user’s normal times for DNS traffic?
  • Are you seeing many requests to the same domain or IP address in a very short period?
  • Does a request generate a series of maximum-length DNS queries or trigger download requests?  
  • Does a logs review reveal multiple domain names that are very similar and that begin like normal words but finish in strings that look like a cat walked over the keyboard?

Make life hard for attackers

DNS can be used in many different types of attacks, not just tunneling, and it can’t be overlooked when shaping a security strategy. While DNS monitoring isn’t a complete security solution, not having this in place constitutes a huge gap in an organization’s network defenses and ability to investigate. Use the above best practices to review and adjust the security plan to move this low-hanging fruit out of attackers’ reach.

https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/100485-dns-tunneling-how-its-evolved-and-four-ways-to-reduce-the-risk