Attackers Encrypt VMware ESXi Server With Python Ransomware

A recently observed attack employed a Python-based ransomware variant to target an organization’s VMware ESXi server and encrypt all virtual disks, Sophos reports.

The attack involved the use of a custom Python script that, once executed on the target organization’s virtual machine hypervisor, took all VMs offline.

The attackers, Sophos’ security researchers explain, were rather quick to execute the ransomware: the encryption process started roughly three hours after initial compromise.

For initial access, the attackers compromised a TeamViewer account that did not have multi-factor authentication set up, and which was running in the background on a computer belonging to a user that had Domain Administrator credentials.

The attackers waited 30 minutes past midnight in the organization’s time zone to log in, then downloaded and executed a tool to identify targets on the network, which allowed them to find a VMware ESXi server, Sophos explains.

At around 2am, the attackers fetched an SSH client to log into the server, leveraging the built-in SSH service ESXi Shell that can be enabled on ESXi servers for management purposes.

Three hours after the network was first scanned, the attackers logged into the ESXi Shell, copied the Python script, and then executed it for each datastore disk volume, thus encrypting the virtual disk and settings files for virtual machines.

The script is only 6kb in size, but allows attackers to configure it with multiple encryption keys, as well as with various email addresses and with the file suffix to be appended to encrypted files.

According to Sophos, the script contains multiple hardcoded encryption keys, and a routine for generating even more keys, which led the researchers to the conclusion that the ransomware creates a unique key at each run.

Thus, in this particular attack, because the attackers executed the script separately for each of the three targeted ESXi datastores, a new key was created for each encryption process. The script doesn’t transmit the keys but instead writes them to the filesystem, encrypted with the hardcoded public key.

“Python is pre-installed on Linux-based systems such as ESXi, and this makes Python-based attacks possible on such systems. ESXi servers represent an attractive target for ransomware threat actors because they can attack multiple virtual machines at once, where each of the virtual machines could be running business-critical applications or services,” Andrew Brandt, principal researcher at Sophos, said.

Related: Colossus Ransomware Hits Automotive Company in the U.S.

Related: Links Found Between MSHTML Zero-Day Attacks and Ransomware Operations

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Ionut Arghire is an international correspondent for SecurityWeek.

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Aggressive Ransomware Group FIN12 Moves Fast, Targets Big Companies

A report published by Mandiant on Thursday details the activities and tools of FIN12, a highly aggressive ransomware group that has likely made a significant amount of money over the past years.

The threat group, tracked until now by Mandiant as UNC1878, has been around since at least October 2018. The UNC classification is assigned to “uncategorized” entities before the cybersecurity firm can determine with certainty if it’s a financially-motivated group (FIN) or a state-sponsored advanced persistent threat actor (APT).

FIN12 has mostly used the Ryuk ransomware in its attacks and it has relied on other cybercrime groups for initial access into victims’ environments. Until March 2020, they mostly relied on access obtained by operators of the Trickbot trojan, but later they started leveraging other malware, as well as remote Citrix and RDP logins using credentials that were likely obtained on underground forums.

Unlike other ransomware gangs, FIN12 in most cases does not spend time stealing valuable information from victims’ environments before encrypting their data and making a ransom demand. Instead, they appear to prioritize speed — researchers determined that, on average, they only spend less than three days in the victim’s network before encrypting files and making their presence known with a ransom demand.

What’s in a Threat Group Name? An Inside Look at the Intricacies of Nation-State Attribution

In addition, they only seem to target organizations that have a revenue of at least $300 million — the average annual revenue of FIN12 victims known to Mandiat was over $6 billion.

Cybercrime groups using the Ryuk ransomware typically demand a ransom ranging between $5 million and $50 million.

Kimberly Goody, director of financial crime at Mandiant, told SecurityWeek that while they don’t typically have direct insight into victim negotiations, based on their observations, FIN12’s ransom demands ranged from $1 million to $25 million.

“Even if a small percentage of victims paid a ransom, FIN12 had the potential to receive tens of millions per month,” Goody said. “While it isn’t a direct one to one comparison to FIN12, we know more broadly that ransomware operations deploying RYUK have been highly profitable. A prior analysis that we did of victim communications illuminated the high profits that ransomware threat actors can net. Payments received by cryptocurrency wallet addresses between Jan 2019 and April 2020 that we suspect were largely affiliated with RYUK victim ransom payments, although not exclusively FIN12 victims, totaled more than $150 million USD. These profits are significant and can be reinvested into both people and tools used to improve the efficacy of future operations.”

The group has targeted a wide range of industries, including many healthcare organizations, which some ransomware gangs have pledged to avoid. Mandiant said 20 percent of FIN12 victims are in the healthcare sector.

A majority of the organizations targeted by FIN12 were located in North America, with 71 percent located in the U.S. and 12 percent in Canada. However, researchers believe the group’s regional targeting has been expanding, including to Europe and the APAC region.

FIN12 ransomware gang victims

One region they have not targeted is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes Russia and other former Soviet countries. In fact, Mandiant says the cybercriminals are Russian speakers and they likely operate from a CIS country.

According to Mandiant, FIN12 took an extended break during the summer of 2020 and there was also some downtime in early 2021, around the holidays. Joshua Shilko, principal technical analyst at Mandiant, told SecurityWeek that the group now appears to be on a break since early June 2021.

“While this may indicate that they’ve gone separate ways or something, it’s not uncommon in their history for them to have these breaks. And when they do return, there’s a few things we would expect,” Shilko said. “Their TTPs, their playbook has largely remained the same for nearly three years, which is pretty remarkable. When they do make changes, they make ones that are impactful and help to avoid detection, things like changing the obfuscation, changing their in memory loaders, changing their Malleable C2 profiles, sometimes switching up their post-intrusion frameworks. So, even though we haven’t seen them for a couple months here, we have no illusions about them being gone forever.”

Mandiant’s report on FIN12 includes information on victimology, initial access, TTPs, use of malware and criminal services, monetization, and origins.

Mandiant was until recently part of FireEye. However, the FireEye Products business and the FireEye name were sold earlier this year to private equity firm Symphony Technology Group (STG) for $1.2 billion. Mandiant officially announced this week that its corporate name has changed from FireEye to Mandiant, and its common stock ticker symbol on Nasdaq has changed from FEYE to MNDT.

Related: Attacks Targeting Accellion Product Linked to FIN11 Cybercrime Group

Related: FIN8 Hackers Add ‘Sardonic’ Backdoor to Malware Arsenal

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Eduard Kovacs (@EduardKovacs) is a contributing editor at SecurityWeek. He worked as a high school IT teacher for two years before starting a career in journalism as Softpedia’s security news reporter. Eduard holds a bachelor’s degree in industrial informatics and a master’s degree in computer techniques applied in electrical engineering.

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Iran-linked MalKamak Hackers Targeting Aerospace, Telcos With ShellClient RAT

Operation GhostShell Believed to be Linked to Iranian Threat Actor

Researchers have discovered a previously unknown advanced threat actor, probably of Iranian origin, using a previously undocumented RAT targeting largely aerospace and telecommunications organizations. They have named the group MalKamak, and the campaign Operation GhostShell.

Cybereason first detected the threat actor engaged in cyber espionage with the unknown remote access trojan – which it called ShellClient – in July 2021. Initial investigation found the same group targeting aerospace and telecommunications companies in the Middle East. Further investigation found the group also targeting the same sectors in the U.S., Russia, and Europe.

In an analysis report of its investigation, Cybereason has determined that MalKamak has been operating undiscovered since at least 2018. During that period, the ShellClient RAT has evolved from a simple standalone reverse shell to a stealthy modular espionage tool.

The MalKamak group is believed to be of Iranian origin. Although the researchers could find nothing to associate the group with any known APT, they did discover some links to the Iranian Chafer threat actor (also known as APT39, ITG07 and Remix Kitten). They also noticed similarities in coding style and naming conventions with another Iranian group, Agrius, that is primarily known for attacking Israeli organizations and companies. 

[ Also Read: What’s in a Threat Group Name? An Inside Look at the Intricacies of Nation-State Attribution ]

Assaf Dahan, head of threat research at Cybereason, suggested that a previous member of Chafer or Agrius could now be involved with MalKamak, or perhaps all three groups have employed the same ‘freelancer’ at some stage. However, he told SecurityWeek that no inferences could be drawn from the absence of China from the list of targets.

“We detected nothing to suggest any Chinese involvement,” he said. Other researchers using different telemetry might subsequently find that Chinese organizations have also been targeted. For now, Cybereason is confident, based primarily on code analysis, that MalKamak is an Iranian group.

The ShellClient RAT is designed for stealth, including the more recent use of Dropbox to host its C2 operations. The use of public cloud services is a growing trend with cybercriminals, allowing C2 communication to blend in with legitimate traffic from such sites. ShellClient uses cold files stored on Dropbox, and replaced as required by the attacker, rather than the more usual interactive C2 sessions.

“To communicate with Dropbox,” say the researchers, “ShellClient uses Dropbox’s API with a unique embedded API key. Before communicating, it encrypts the data using a hardcoded AES encryption key.” This approach is effective and resilient. C2 communication is less likely to be detected by victim systems, while discovery simply requires the Dropbox folders to be rebuilt elsewhere on the service.

The Dropbox storage contains three folders: an agents folder to store uploaded information from victim machines; a commands folder that stores the commands to be fetched, executed, and then deleted by ShellClient; and a results folder that stores the output of the commands executed by ShellClient. The commands folder is checked by ShellClient every two seconds. Commands are downloaded, parsed, and readied for execution – and then deleted from Dropbox.

The ShellClient RAT, now at version 4, is a modular PE using Costura to compress each of the modules using zlib, and containing numerous evasion techniques. For example, the executable stores most of its strings, including configuration strings, as bytes, and then converts them in real-time to Unicode/ASCII to evade antivirus strings detection. 

It achieves persistence and privilege escalation to run with SYSTEM privileges on victim machines by creating the nhdService disguised as Network Hosts Detection Service. MalKamak was also observed using an unknown executable named lsa.exe for credential dumping. Although Cybereason was unable to obtain a copy of this executable, it speculates that it may be a variation of SafetyKatz. This is largely based on the name of the dump file created by the tool (debug.bin), which is the same as that created by SafetyKatz, which has previously been tied to Iranian threat actors.

 

[ Also Read: NSA’s Rob Joyce Explains ‘Sand and Friction’ Security Strategy ]

Important files for exfiltration are first compressed with WinRar before being exported to the Dropbox C2 folders.

The current version of ShellClient has evolved from the first detected version that was compiled on November 06, 2018. This version lacks the features and sophistication found in later versions, and is effectively a rather simple reverse shell. The second version emerged after just three weeks, now including a new service persistence method disguised as a Windows Defender Update service.

By December 2018, version 2.1 adds a variety of new capabilities including FTP and Telnet clients, AES encryption, self-update capabilities and more.

Version 3.1 appeared in January 2019 with mostly minor changes. “The main difference,” say the researchers, “is the removal of the ‘Server’ component from the executable, as well as new code obfuscation and an upgraded commands menu.”

Version 4.0 appeared in August 2021, with multiple improvements and new capabilities including code obfuscation and code protection using Costura; and abandoning the C2 domain and switching to Dropbox for C2. The latest version contains several command functions that seem to do nothing and have no reference in the code. Despite its rapid evolution over the last few years, it seems as if the developers still have future plans for the malware.

Our current assessment, say the Cybereason researchers, is that Operation GhostShell is perpetrated by a newly discovered Iranian activity group called MalKamak using “a sophisticated new Remote Access Trojan (RAT) dubbed ShellClient that was used in highly targeted attacks against a select few Aerospace and Telecommunications companies mainly in the Middle East, with other victims located in the U.S., Russia and Europe.”

Related: Leaked Files from Offensive Cyber Unit Show Iran’s Interest in Targeting ICS

Related: Iran-Linked Hackers Expand Arsenal with New Android Backdoor

Related: DeadRinger: Three-Pronged Attack by Chinese Military Against Major Telcos

Related: Unknown Chinese APT Targets Russian Defense Sector

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Kevin Townsend is a Senior Contributor at SecurityWeek. He has been writing about high tech issues since before the birth of Microsoft. For the last 15 years he has specialized in information security; and has had many thousands of articles published in dozens of different magazines – from The Times and the Financial Times to current and long-gone computer magazines.

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Microsoft: Russia Behind 58% of Detected State-Backed Hacks

Russia accounted for most state-sponsored hacking detected by Microsoft over the past year, with a 58% share, mostly targeting government agencies and think tanks in the United States, followed by Ukraine, Britain and European NATO members, the company said.

The devastating effectiveness of the long-undetected SolarWinds hack — it mainly breached information technology businesses including Microsoft — also boosted Russian state-backed hackers’ success rate to 32% in the year ending June 30, compared with 21% in the preceding 12 months.

China, meanwhile, accounted for fewer than 1 in 10 of the state-backed hacking attempts Microsoft detected but was successful 44% of the time in breaking into targeted networks, Microsoft said in its second annual Digital Defense Report, which covers July 2020 through June 2021.

While Russia’s prolific state-sponsored hacking is well known, Microsoft’s report offers unusually specific detail on how it stacks up against that by other U.S. adversaries.

[ Also Read: What’s in a Threat Group Name? An Inside Look at the Intricacies of Nation-State Attribution ]

The report also cited ransomware attacks as a serious and growing plague, with the United States by far the most targeted country, hit by more than triple the attacks of the next most targeted nation. Ransomware attacks are criminal and financially motivated.

By contrast, state-backed hacking is chiefly about intelligence gathering — whether for national security or commercial or strategic advantage — and thus generally tolerated by governments, with U.S. cyber operators among the most skilled. The report by Microsoft Corp., which works closely with Washington government agencies, does not address U.S. government hacking.

The SolarWinds hack was such an embarrassment to the U.S. government, however, that some Washington lawmakers demanded some sort of retaliation. President Joe Biden has had a difficult time drawing a red line for what cyberactivity is permissible. He has issued vague warnings to President Vladimir Putin to get him to crack down on ransomware criminals, but several top administration cybersecurity officials said this week that they have seen no evidence of that.

Overall, nation-state hacking has about a 10%-20% success rate, said Cristin Goodwin, who heads Microsoft’s Digital Security Unit, which is focused on nation-state actors. “It’s something that’s really important for us to try to stay ahead of — and keep driving that compromised number down — because the lower it gets, the better we’re doing,” Goodwin said.

Goodwin finds China’s “geopolitical goals” in its recent cyberespionage especially notable, including targeting foreign ministries in Central and South American countries where it is making Belt-and-Road-Initiative infrastructure investments and universities in Taiwan and Hong Kong where resistance to Beijing’s regional ambitions is strong. The findings further belie as obsolete any conventional wisdom that Chinese cyber spies’ interests are limited to pilfering intellectual property.

Russian hack attempts were up from 52% in the 2019-20 period as a share of global cyber-intrusion bids detected by the “nation-state notification service” that Microsoft employs to alert its customers. For the year ending June 30, North Korea was second as country of origin at 23%, up from less than 11% previously. China dipped to 8% from 12%.

But attempt volume and efficacy are different matters. North Korea’s failure rate on spear-phishing — targeting individuals, usually with booby-trapped emails — was 94% in the past year, Microsoft found.

Only 4% of all state-backed hacking that Microsoft detected targeted critical infrastructure, the Redmond, Washington-based company said, with Russian agents far less interested in it than Chinese or Iranian cyber-operatives.

[ Also Read: NSA’s Rob Joyce Explains ‘Sand and Friction’ Security Strategy ]

After the SolarWinds hack was discovered in December, the Russians transitioned back to focus mostly on government agencies involved in foreign policy, defense and national security, followed by think tanks then health care, where they targeted organizations developing and testing COVID-19 vaccines and treatments in the United States, Australia, Canada, Israel, India and Japan.

In the report, Microsoft said Russian state hackers’ recent greater efficacy “could portend more high-impact compromises in the year ahead.” Accounting for more 92% of the detected Russian activity was the elite hacking team in Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence agency best known as Cozy Bear.

Cozy Bear, which Microsoft calls Nobelium, was behind the SolarWinds hack, which went undetected for most of 2020 and whose discovery badly embarrassed Washington. Among badly compromised U.S. government agencies was the Department of Justice, from which the Russian cyber spies exfiltrated 80% of the email accounts used by the U.S. attorneys’ offices in New York.

Microsoft’s nation-state notifications, of which about 7,500 were issued globally in the period covered by the report, are by no means exhaustive. They only reflect what Microsoft detects.

Related: Attribution Hell: Cyberspies Hacking Other Cyberspies

Related: Attribution Concerns Raised Over Cyber Sanctions Program

Related: FBI Attribution of ‘VPNFilter’ Attack Raises Questions

Related: WikiLeaks Releases CIA Tool Used to Impede Malware Attribution

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Nigerian Man Living in U.S. Charged Over Role in BEC Scheme

A Nigerian national residing in Buffalo, New York, was indicted this week for facilitating a business email compromise (BEC) scam that resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars being stolen from various companies.

Charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the man, Eric Iwu, aka James, 32, faces up to 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000.

BEC scammers typically target organizations that conduct wire transfers, and they impersonate CEOs or other executives that can authorize wire transfers, and then alter invoices to redirect funds to bank accounts controlled by the attackers.

One of the victims, a power construction company located in Dubai, UAE, fell victim to a BEC fraud attack using a Wells Fargo checking account. In 2018, the company was defrauded of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Iwu, the United States Department of Justice says, was the registered owner of a checking account opened at a Citizens Bank in West Seneca, NY, which received two wire transfers related to the scam.

In February 2019, a United Kingdom company was the victim of a BEC attack that employed a Northwest Bank checking account that was eventually traced to Iwu. The company sent $55,242 to the checking account.

Another account traced to Iwu was a business account opened at the Citizens Bank in June 2019. The account received two wire transfers of $131,636 and $112,912 from the third and fourth victim of the BEC operation, respectively.

The defendant appeared at a hearing and was placed in detention, pending further proceedings.

Related: Turkish National Charged for DDoS Attack on U.S. Company

Related: US Charges Swiss ‘Hacktivist’ for Data Theft and Leaks

Related: U.S. Charges North Korean Hackers Over $1.3 Billion Bank Heists

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Ionut Arghire is an international correspondent for SecurityWeek.

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Streaming Site Twitch Confirms Hack

Amazon’s popular live video streaming platform Twitch said Wednesday hackers had broken into its network after reports of exposed confidential company data surfaced online.

The service, where users often stream live video game play, confirmed the break-in on Twitter.

“We can confirm a breach has taken place,” Twitch said in post from its verified Twitter account.

“Our teams are working with urgency to understand the extent of this.”

The statement came after reports emerged that a massive dump of Twitch data had been posted on fringe anonymous message board 4Chan.

A post at 4Chan served up 125 gigabytes of data reported to include Twitch source code, records of payouts to streamers, and a digital video game distribution service being built by Amazon Game Studios.

It did not appear that personal Twitch user data was in the dump, but the extent of the hack was still being investigated.

Google searches for “how to delete Twitch” rocketed eightfold as news of the hack spread, according to marketing analysts firm N. Rich.

“With such a concerning data breach from a platform as widespread and global as Twitch, users are naturally wanting to protect themselves and their data as soon as possible,” an N.Rich spokesperson said.

The person who posted the trove of stolen data left a message claiming the break-in was performed to foster competition in video streaming, and because the Twitch community “is a disgusting toxic cesspool,” according to media reports.

Users of Twitch, the world’s biggest video game streaming site, staged a virtual walkout last month to voice outrage over barrages of racist, sexist and homophobic abuse on the platform.

The phenomenon of “hate raids” — torrents of abuse — has seen the platform become increasingly unpleasant many for Twitch streamers who are not white or straight.

A Twitter hashtag, #TwitchDoBetter, has become a magnet for complaints over the past month, largely from female, non-white and LGBTQ players saying that Twitch is failing to stop internet trolls running amok — all while taking 50 percent of streamers’ earnings.

Twitch has maintained that it is working to improve tools for protecting accounts from abuses.

The service is suing two users in US federal court, accusing them of orchestrating the so-called “hate raids.”

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Ransomware Risk Assessment Service Aims to Deflect Attacks

The function of cybersecurity is not to eliminate all attacks and compromises – that’s impossible – but to make the attack so expensive and time-consuming on the attacker that he simply moves on to an easier target. That is the purpose of a new product/service designed to make commodity ransomware attacks less easy for the attacker.

Security experts at Qualys have analyzed 36 leading ransomware families and their attacks over the last five years. They find that unpatched vulnerabilities, device misconfigurations, internet-facing assets and unauthorized software consistently rank among the top attack vectors.

Leveraging its own VMDR cloud platform and applying the results of its research, Qualys has developed a tailored service – the Ransomware Risk Assessment Service – designed to detect and remediate the most common routes taken by ransomware attacks. 

Their researchers isolated the 110 CVEs most used by the criminals in these attacks. In almost all cases, these vulnerabilities have been patched by the vendor, but left unpatched by the victim. For example, the top five CVEs exploited by ransomware gangs are CVE-2013-1493 (used by Exxroute, vendor patched in March 2013); CVE-2013-0431 (used by Reveton, patched in February 2013); CVE-2012-1723 (Urausy, June 2012); CVE-2019-1458 (NetWalker, December 2019); and CVE-2018-12808 (Ryuk/Conti, August 2018). 

If these CVEs had been patched by the victims, the attacker would be required to find a different entry point, or just as likely moved on to an unpatched site. As it stands, a Qualys report suggests that just these five CVEs have, through ransomware, “negatively impacted millions of assets across organizations worldwide.”

The importance of patching is well understood – the continued failure of organizations to patch thoroughly is less easy to understand. A study by Trustwave at the end of September 2021 found that despite all the warnings and publicity, more than 20% of the world’s Microsoft Exchange Server installations had not patched the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities by August 31, 2021. This is concerning. If whitehat researchers can discover these servers, it is certain the blackhat criminals also know them.

So, the cornerstone of the Qualys service is to first locate the existence of these vulnerabilities, and then automatically patch them. This requires complete knowledge of the customer’s IT real estate – a knowledge that many companies do not have. New servers are spun up in the cloud, used for a single purpose (such as testing) and then forgotten and abandoned, but still extant. Other servers are just abandoned in the data center, replaced by newer hardware but still connected to the internet. Anything connected to the internet can be found and exploited by the criminals, but may effectively be unknown to the company.

Part of the Qualys solution includes a global asset discovery and software inventory that locates and identifies all internet-facing assets and unauthorized software to eliminate the blind spots in a company’s security defenses. The necessary patches can then be applied automatically to everywhere they are needed.

Ransomware Exposure Points

Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment dashboard

This just leaves misconfigurations as the remaining attack vector leveraged in ransomware attacks. The researchers have isolated the most used misconfiguration, such as insecure RDP and admin shares, and have mapped them to the relevant MITRE ATT&CK techniques. The result is 237 configuration checks across five security areas such as RDP hardening, user controls, network, protocol, and port configuration security, share and password policies and software update policies – enabling companies to shut down 20 of the attack techniques used in ransomware.

“Ransomware risk is top of mind for CISOs who are no longer satisfied with reactive tools and generic guidelines. They want actionable information to reduce risk proactively,” says Sumedh Thakar, president and CEO of Qualys. “The Qualys security team has extensively researched past ransomware attacks as well as CISA, MS-ISAC and NIST guidance and operationalized it into a prescriptive, actionable plan so companies can proactively remediate to stay ahead of ransomware attacks and reduce their overall risk.” 

The result is not a solution to ransomware, but a way in which individual companies can harden their systems against ransomware. It is the same principle used in physical policing – a long-standing concept known as CPTED (crime prevention through environmental design). CPTED does not prevent crime delivered by a determined criminal, but it makes it too difficult for the average criminal who will simply move on to a less secure target

“While there is no silver bullet to prevent ransomware, companies can take charge with proactive measures including solid cybersecurity hygiene, patching for known ransomware vulnerabilities, changing configurations and adjusting security policies,” said Jim Reavis, co-founder and CEO of the Cloud Security Alliance. “Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment puts cybersecurity teams in control by operationalizing government guidelines and providing a company-specific ransomware heatmap so they can eliminate an area of risk and shrink their attack surface.”

The Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment service, like CPTED, does not eliminate the crime – it is aimed at deflecting the criminal to an easier victim.

Related: CISA Adds Ransomware Module to Cyber Security Evaluation Tool

Related: Two ‘Prolific’ Ransomware Operators Arrested in Ukraine

Related: Links Found Between MSHTML Zero-Day Attacks and Ransomware Operations

Related: FBI: 16 Conti Ransomware Attacks Targeted Healthcare, First Responders in U.S.

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Kevin Townsend is a Senior Contributor at SecurityWeek. He has been writing about high tech issues since before the birth of Microsoft. For the last 15 years he has specialized in information security; and has had many thousands of articles published in dozens of different magazines – from The Times and the Financial Times to current and long-gone computer magazines.

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Suit Blames Baby’s Death on Cyberattack at Alabama Hospital

An Alabama woman whose 9-month-old daughter died has filed suit against the hospital where she was born claiming it did not disclose that its computer systems had been crippled by a cyberattack, which resulted in diminished care that resulted in the baby’s death.

Springhill Medical Center was deep in the midst of a ransomware attack when Nicko Silar was born July 17, 2019, and the resulting failure of electronic devices meant a doctor could not properly monitor the child’s condition during delivery, according to the lawsuit by Teiranni Kidd, the child’s mother.

Left with severe brain injuries and other problems, the baby died last year after months of intensive care at another hospital.

The lawsuit, initially filed in Mobile County in 2019 while Nicko was still alive, was first reported by The Wall Street Journal on Thursday.

The malpractice lawsuit, which seeks an unspecified amount of money from the hospital and Dr. Katelyn Braswell Parnell, who delivered Nicko, contends Springhill did not reveal the severity of the cyberattack publicly or to Kidd. The woman “would have gone to a different and safer hospital for labor and delivery” had she known what was going on, it claims.

Springhill has denied wrongdoing and asked a judge to dismiss the most serious part of the lawsuit, which contends officials conspired to publicly create a “false, misleading, and deceptive narrative” about the cyberattack in a scheme that made the child’s delivery unsafe.

[ Read: German Hospital Hacked, Patient Taken to Another City Dies ]

The hospital claimed any blame lies with Parnell, who “was fully aware of the inaccessibility of the relevant systems, including those in the labor and delivery unit, and yet determined that (Kidd) could safely deliver her at Springhill.” Under Alabama law, the hospital did not have any legal duty to provide Kidd with details of the cyberattack, the hospital argued.

Parnell and her medical group, Bay Area Physicians for Women, denied she did anything that hurt Nicko or caused the child’s injuries and death.

Springhill released a public statement about the cyberattack the day before the child was born saying staff “has continued to safely care for our patients and will continue to provide the high quality of service that our patients deserve and expect,” WKRG-TV reported at the time.

Related: COVID-19’s Healthcare Feeding Frenzy for Cybercriminals

Related: German Experts See Russian Link in Deadly Hospital Hacking

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ChamelGang Hackers Target Energy, Aviation, and Government Sectors

New “ChamelGang” APT group group has not been associated with any existing threat actor

A new advanced threat group has been detected targeting energy and aviation firms in Russia, and institutions including governments in nine other countries. The group has not been associated with any existing APT, nor is its country of origin known. It has been named ChamelGang after its practice of blending into the background like a chameleon. 

ChamelGang was first detected following repeated anti-virus alerts on the presence of Cobalt Strike Beacon in RAM at a Russian Energy organization. This breach was investigated and analyzed by Positive Technologies (PT). Using what it learned, PT discovered and analyzed a second attack by the same threat group against an organization in the Russian aviation sector.

PT subsequently found attacks against institutions in nine other countries, including the United States, India, Nepal, Taiwan, and Japan, where in five countries, researchers discovered compromised government servers. These other attacks have not been analyzed in PT’s report on ChamelGang, but all of the victims have been notified by their national CERTs. Since the gang uses the ProxyShell vulnerabilities in its attack chain, PT thinks it possible that vulnerable servers in the UK will be targeted in the future.

The attack against the Russian energy organization made use of a trusted relationship compromise. Such attacks differ from supply chain attacks: the former makes use of the legitimate communication channels in a trusted relationship, while the latter compromises goods (hardware or software) supplied from one company to another. In this case, ChamelGang exploited a JBoss Application Server vulnerability (CVE-2017-12149, patched by RedHat more than four years ago) in a subsidiary organization.

It took only two weeks for the gang to cross to the primary target. They acquired the dictionary password of the local administrator on one of the servers, and used RDP to penetrate the network. They remained on the network for three months, gaining control of most of it, before being detected.

In the second attack analyzed by PT, the gang used the ProxyShell chain of vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207). In this case, however, they were resident for just eight days before being expelled, and had little time to do serious damage.

“Targeting the fuel and energy complex and aviation industry in Russia isn’t unique – this sector is one of the three most frequently attacked,” comments Denis Kuvshinov, head of threat analysis at PT. “Most often such attacks lead to financial or data loss – in 84% of all cases last year, the attacks were specifically created to steal data, and that causes major financial and reputational damage.”

A distinctive feature of the ChamelGang attacks is the use of three previously unknown malwares: ProxyT, BeaconLoader, and the DoorMe backdoor. The gang also employed the better-known Cobalt Strike Beacon, FRP and Tiny Shell.

PT found the DoorMe backdoor to be one of the most interesting new artefacts. “This is a native IIS module that is registered as a filter through which HTTP requests and responses are processed,” explains Denis Goydenko, head of information security threat response at PT. “Its principle of operation is unusual: the backdoor processes only those requests in which the correct cookie parameter is set. At the time of the incident investigation, DoorMe was not detected by antivirus tools, and although the technique of installing this backdoor is known, we haven’t seen its use in recent times.”

In the first compromise, the DoorMe variant could receive six commands: return current directory, username, and hostname; run an arbitrary command by cmd.exe/c; run a command by creating a new process; write a file (to different methods; and copy the timestamps from one file to another.

In the second compromise, DoorMe had been expanded and the method of obfuscation changed. The number of commands it can receive had been expanded to 11, with the addition of, return the current working directory of the application (two methods); get information on the content of a selected directory; get a list of processes; and terminate and delete a specified process.

Of the other two new malwares, ProxyT is designed to check whether there is a connection to a remote URL. BeaconLoader is uploaded using DLL Hijacking. It receives the addresses of the functions and libraries necessary for its operation, and then it checks the name of the parent process and the privilege type. 

A second version of BeaconLoader was also discovered, this time uploaded using the IKEEXT service. This version was similar but not identical to the first version. In both cases, Cobalt Strike Beacon was the ultimate payload.

The common factor in the ChamelGang compromises seems to be the existence of vulnerable versions of Microsoft Exchange Server and use of the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities. Rapid patching is the most obvious preventative measure – but it is worth noting that on August 31, 2021, Trustwave found that 21.17% of Exchange Servers were still susceptible to the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities, while 5.92% were vulnerable to ProxyLogon. Until these servers are patched, they will continue to be attacked by both ChamelGang and other threat actors.

Related: CISA Warns Organizations of ProxyShell Attacks on Exchange Servers

Related: Hackers Deploying Backdoors on Exchange Servers via ProxyShell Vulnerabilities

Related: Sanctioned Russian IT Firm Was Partner with Microsoft, IBM

Related: At Least 30k Internet-Exposed Exchange Servers Vulnerable to ProxyShell Attacks

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Kevin Townsend is a Senior Contributor at SecurityWeek. He has been writing about high tech issues since before the birth of Microsoft. For the last 15 years he has specialized in information security; and has had many thousands of articles published in dozens of different magazines – from The Times and the Financial Times to current and long-gone computer magazines.

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Proposed Bill Would Require Organizations to Report Ransomware Payments

U.S. senators this week introduced a bill that would require critical infrastructure organizations to inform the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) if they experience a cyberattack, and it would also require most private companies to notify the government if they have made a payment in response to a ransomware attack.

The bipartisan bill, named the Cyber Incident Reporting Act, was introduced by senators Gary Peters (D-MI) and Rob Portman (R-OH), who also plan on introducing separate legislation to update the Federal Information Security Modernization Act with requirements for federal agencies and their contractors to report cyberattacks.

The Cyber Incident Reporting Act aims to help the government deal with cyberattacks and help it hold threat actors who target U.S. networks accountable.

If the bill becomes law, critical infrastructure owners and operators will be required to report cyberattacks to CISA within 72 hours.

In addition, other organizations will have to inform CISA within 24 hours if they have decided to make a ransomware payment. This applies to state and local governments, businesses with over 50 employees and even non-profits. Organizations would need to evaluate alternatives before paying cybercriminals.

Federal reporting requirements would be coordinated by a Cybersecurity Incident Reporting Council.

CISA would be given the authority to subpoena organizations that fail to report incidents or ransomware payments. Compliance failures could result in action being taken by the Justice Department and the company being banned from working with the government.

The bill also requires CISA to warn organizations about the vulnerabilities exploited in ransomware attacks, and the National Cyber Director to create a joint task force for preventing and disrupting ransomware attacks.

“This bipartisan bill will give the National Cyber Director, CISA, and other appropriate agencies broad visibility into the cyberattacks taking place across our nation on a daily basis to enable a whole-of-government response, mitigation, and warning to critical infrastructure and others of ongoing and imminent attacks,” said Senator Portman. “This bill strikes a balance between getting information quickly and letting victims respond to an attack without imposing burdensome requirements.”

Related: U.S. Infrastructure Bill Allocates $2 Billion to Cybersecurity

Related: House Passes Several Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Bills

Related: Lawmakers Reintroduce ‘Pipeline Security Act’ Following Colonial Hack

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Eduard Kovacs (@EduardKovacs) is a contributing editor at SecurityWeek. He worked as a high school IT teacher for two years before starting a career in journalism as Softpedia’s security news reporter. Eduard holds a bachelor’s degree in industrial informatics and a master’s degree in computer techniques applied in electrical engineering.

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