Facebook Says Hackers ‘Scraped’ Data of 533 Million Users in 2019 Leak

Facebook said Tuesday that hackers “scraped” personal data of some half-billion users back in 2019 by taking advantage of a feature designed to help people easily find friends using contact lists.

A trove of information about more than 530 million Facebook users was shared over the weekend at a hacker forum, prompting the leading social network to explain what happened and call on people to be vigilant about privacy settings.

“It is important to understand that malicious actors obtained this data not through hacking our systems but by scraping it from our platform prior to September 2019,” Facebook product management director Mike Clark said in a post.

“This is another example of the ongoing, adversarial relationship technology companies have with fraudsters who intentionally break platform policies to scrape internet services.”

The data included phone numbers, birth dates, and email addresses, and some of the data appeared to be current, according to US media reports.

The stolen data did not include passwords or financial data, according to Facebook.

Scraping is a tactic that involves using automated software to gather up information shared publicly online.

“All 533,000,000 Facebook records were just leaked for free,” Alon Gal, chief technology officer at the Hudson Rock cybercrime intelligence firm, said Saturday on Twitter.

He denounced what he called the “absolute negligence” of Facebook.

“Bad actors will certainly use the information for social engineering, scamming, hacking and marketing,” Gal said on Twitter.

Clark urged members of the social network to check their privacy settings to control what information can be seen publicly, and to tighten account security with two-factor authentication.

This is not the first time leaks or use of data from the world’s largest social network — with nearly two billion users — has embroiled Facebook in controversy.

In 2016, a scandal around Cambridge Analytica, a British consulting firm that used the personal data of millions of Facebook users to target political ads, cast a shadow over the social network and its handling of private information.

view counter

© AFP 2020

Previous Columns by AFP:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/7TBc0m9mlFM/facebook-says-hackers-scraped-data-533-million-users-2019-leak




Senators Press for More on SolarWinds Hack After AP Report

Key lawmakers said Tuesday they’re concerned they’ve been kept in the dark about what suspected Russian hackers stole from the federal government and they pressed Biden administration officials for more details about the scope of what’s known as the SolarWinds hack.

In letters to top officials, Sens. Gary Peters and Rob Portman said recent reporting by The Associated Press “raised the troubling possibility that some federal agencies did not fully report” the extent of the breach to Congress.

“Time and again this committee has discussed the challenges of defending against sophisticated, well-resourced, and patient cyber adversaries. Nevertheless, the fact remains that despite significant investments in cyber defenses, the federal government did not initially detect this cyberattack,” the senators wrote. Peters, a Democrat from Michigan, chairs the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Portman, of Ohio, is the top Republican.

The AP reported last month that suspected Russian hackers gained access to email accounts belonging to the Trump administration’s acting homeland security secretary, Chad Wolf, and members of his department’s cybersecurity staff whose jobs included hunting threats from foreign countries.

It’s been nearly four months since officials discovered what they describe as a sprawling, monthslong cyberespionage effort done largely through a hack of a widely used software from Texas-based SolarWinds Inc. At least nine federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, were hacked, along with dozens of private-sector companies.

The senators sent their letters to Brandon Wales, the acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at DHS, and Christopher DeRusha, chief information security officer at the Office of Management and Budget.

The senators are asking for several documents related to the hack, including those that show which individual accounts were targeted or compromised.

Scott McConnell, a spokesman for the cybersecurity agency, said it “does not comment on congressional correspondence.” OMB did not immediately return a request for comment.

Anne Neuberger, deputy national security adviser, said in an interview with The Associated Press last week there were “gaps” in basic cybersecurity defenses at some of the nine agencies affected, which have hampered officials’ ability to determine what the hackers accessed.

She said the administration has identified five needed modernizations as a result of its review of how the SolarWinds hack happened, including using technology that continuously monitors for malicious activity and requiring greater use of multi-factor authentication so systems can’t be accessed with a stolen password alone.

The Biden administration has tried to keep a tight lid on the scope of the SolarWinds attack as it weighs retaliatory measures against Russia. But an inquiry by the AP found new details about the breach at DHS and other agencies, including the Energy Department, where hackers accessed top officials’ schedules.

The AP interviewed more than a dozen current and former U.S. government officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the confidential nature of the ongoing investigation into the hack.

view counter

Previous Columns by Associated Press:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/JTRwjh8v8LU/senators-press-more-solarwinds-hack-after-ap-report




Threat Actors Quick to Target (Patched) SAP Vulnerabilities

Threat actors are constantly targeting new vulnerabilities in SAP applications within days after the availability of security patches, according to a joint report issued by SAP and Onapsis.

In some cases, exploitation attempts were observed shortly after the security bugs are made public: scanning for vulnerable systems started 48 hours after patches were released, with actual exploitation attempts following roughly 24 hours later, an analysis that SAP and Onapsis conducted since mid-2020 has revealed.

Used within more than 400,000 organizations (including 1,000 government and government-owned organizations) for resource planning, management of product lifecycle, human capital, and supply chain, and for various other purposes, SAP’s applications represent an attractive target for adversaries.

During their study, the two organizations observed as many as 300 successful exploitations of SAP-specific vulnerabilities. The attacks were aimed at modifying configurations and user accounts, to ultimately access and exfiltrate business information.

“New unprotected SAP applications provisioned in cloud (IaaS) environments were discovered and attacked in less than three hours, stressing the need to “shift left” and ensure new mission-critical applications are provisioned securely from day one,” according to the report.

Sophisticated threat actors, the two organizations say, are leveraging various attack vectors to compromise organizations through unprotected SAP applications, including chaining together multiple vulnerabilities specific to SAP deployments.

The study also reveals that threat actors are making numerous brute-force attempts targeting high-privilege SAP user accounts, showing once again that maintaining secure system configurations is as important as keeping software patched at all times.

Exploited vulnerabilities include CVE-2020-6287 (also known as RECON, this critical bug has a CVSS score of 10), CVE-2020-6207 (also CVSS score of 10), CVE-2018-2380, CVE-2016-9563, CVE-2016-3976, and CVE-2010-5326. Successful exploitation of unpatched SAP bugs could lead to theft of sensitive data, financial fraud, the disruption of mission-critical business processes, and ransomware attacks, and could even force organizations to completely suspend operations.

Despite known targeting of vulnerable SAP systems, however, some organizations fail to apply the available patches in due time. Thus, together with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Germany’s Federal Cybersecurity Authority (BSI), SAP and Onapsis are advising organizations to immediately apply available patches.

“SAP systems running outdated or misconfigured software are exposed to increased risks of malicious attacks. SAP applications help organizations manage critical business processes—such as enterprise resource planning, product lifecycle management, customer relationship management, and supply chain management,” CISA notes.

Organizations using SAP software are advised to perform compromise assessment on those applications, especially for Internet-facing resources, assess all applications in the SAP environment, perform misconfiguration assessments, and immediately apply all of the available patches where necessary.

Related: Scanning Activity Detected for Critical SAP SolMan Flaw

view counter

Ionut Arghire is an international correspondent for SecurityWeek.

Previous Columns by Ionut Arghire:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/u-KRIGHykMk/threat-actors-quick-target-patched-sap-vulnerabilities




ThreatQuotient Adds $22.5 Million in Funding

ThreatQuotient, a threat intelligence and security operations platform provider, has closed $22.5 million in new financing through a combination of equity and debt financing.

In total, ThreatQuotient has now raised $60 million in equity plus a debt facility.

Founded in 2013 by Wayne Chiang and Ryan Trost, who previously worked at a Security Operations Center of defense contractor General Dynamics, ThreatQuotient offers a threat intelligence platform that helps customers manage and correlate external sources with all internal analytics solutions for contextual, operationalized intelligence.

ThreatQuotient LogoThe Reston, Virginia-based company says the additional funding will help “accelerate execution of new innovations currently in development.”

“As a result of strong performance in 2020, we welcomed an opportunity to secure additional funding and add new investors to our syndicate. ThreatQuotient is meeting a critical need for security operations solutions, and we have significant expansion plans to continue this momentum,” said John Czupak, President and CEO, ThreatQuotient. 

The investment syndicate includes New Enterprise Associates (NEA), Adams Street Partners, Escalate Capital, Blu Ventures, Cisco Investments and Gaingels.

Marc Solomon, Chief Marketing Officer at ThreatQuotient, is a longstanding SecurityWeek industry contributor.

Related: ThreatQuotient Raises $30 Million in Series C Funding 

view counter

Previous Columns by SecurityWeek News:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/4aHGskygLGw/threatquotient-adds-225-million-funding




APT Group Using Voice Changing Software in Spear-Phishing Campaign

A sub-group of the ‘Molerats’ threat-actor has been using voice-changing software to successfully trick targets into installing malware, according to a warning from Cado Security.

The Molerats hacking group, also tagged as Gaza Hackers Team, Gaza Cybergang,DustySky, Extreme Jackal, and Moonlight, has been active since at least 2012, mainly targeting entities in the Middle East, but also launching attacks against targets in Europe and the United States.

Cado Security says that APT-C-23, believed to be part of Molerats, typically uses social engineering to trick victims into installing malware, and was previously observed impersonating women in attacks that leveraged social media sites to target soldiers in the Israel Defence Forces.

In recent attacks targeting political opponents, APT-C-23 appears to have taken the spear-phishing to a new level, through the use of voice-changing software to pose as women (the group’s members that have been identified so far are all men).

“APT-C-23 has been observed impersonating women to engage victims in conversations. As the conversations continue, the group sends video laden with malware to infect the target’s system,” Cado Security said.

While analyzing a publicly exposed server pertaining to the hacking group, Cado Security researchers identified an archive containing photos from the Instagram account of a female model, along with the installation for the voice changing application Morph Vox Pro.

“Given the context of both previous APT-C-23 attacks and the other contents of the folder, we think the most likely explanation for MorphVox being part of their toolset is that it was used to produce audio messages in a female voice to encourage targets to install their malware,” the company said.

On the same server, the researchers identified various tools employed by the attacks, such as the application used to bulk-send phishing emails, another to hack Voice over IP systems, one with example commands to find vulnerable routers, and a folder containing a Microsoft credential phishing page.

Related: Backdoors Used by Hamas-Linked APT Abuse Facebook, Dropbox

Related: New Backdoor Attacks Leverage Political Turmoil in Middle East

view counter

Ionut Arghire is an international correspondent for SecurityWeek.

Previous Columns by Ionut Arghire:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/ii-bL2yFQ2Q/apt-group-using-voice-changing-software-spear-phishing-campaign




US DoD Launches Vuln Disclosure Program for Contractor Networks

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) this week announced the launch of a new vulnerability disclosure program on HackerOne to identify vulnerabilities in Defense Industrial Base (DIB) contractor networks.

Running as a pilot, the Defense Industrial Base Vulnerability Disclosure Program (DIB-VDP) covers participating DoD contractor partner’s information systems and web properties, as well as other assets within scope, and is separate from the DoD vulnerability disclosure program that already runs on HackerOne.

As part of the DIB-VDP Pilot, DoD invites the HackerOne community to remotely test the participating DoD contractors’ assets and report on any identified vulnerabilities.

Interested researchers, however, are prohibited from doing any harm to the vulnerable systems, from accessing or exfiltrating data, from compromising the privacy or safety of DoD or the contractor, as well as from sharing any information with third parties.

“Any information submitted to the DIB-VDP under this program will be used for defensive purposes – to mitigate or remediate vulnerabilities in DoD contractor information systems, networks, or applications. This research is not contributing to offensive tools or capabilities,” the program’s policy reads.

Researchers looking to participate are encouraged to read the provided guidelines and glance over the assets that are within scope of the program, as well as over the rest of the terms and conditions of the DIB-VDP.

The DIB-VDP Pilot is a voluntary event that will run for 12 months.  

Related: U.S. Gov Announces ‘Hack the Army 3.0’ Bug Bounty Program

Related: HackerOne Paid Out Over $107 Million in Bug Bounties

Related: Hackers Earn $275,000 for Vulns in U.S. Army Systems

view counter

Ionut Arghire is an international correspondent for SecurityWeek.

Previous Columns by Ionut Arghire:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/0nJopxIAayM/us-dod-launches-vuln-disclosure-program-contractor-networks




All Eyes on PCAP: The Gold Standard of Traffic Analysis

PCAP Enables Defenders to See and Capture Exactly What Has Happened Across a Network, But Comes With Challenges

PCAP, or full packet data capture for analysis, does what it says – it captures the entirety of every packet that comprises the network traffic (both metadata and content). If something happens on the network, PCAP knows about it. Whether it is malware moving data around, or staff arranging a private party, it can be captured and then analyzed.

PCAP provides what CISOs seek but rarely achieve – total visibility into the network.

The security potential for this type of traffic monitoring is clear, and probably explains the motivation for a number of U.S. federal agencies investigating their options. Toward the end of 2020, in the first flush of the SolarWinds debacle, the DHS, the Department of State, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) all issued requests for proposals (RFPs) and requests for information (RFIs) for PCAP solutions.

The Homeland Security Department’s Enterprise Security Operations Center stated that it considered “Full Packet Capture a cornerstone of the cyber security visibility stack enabling analysts to perform investigation analysis while also satisfying DHS security requirements.”

This sudden rush to PCAP poses a couple of obvious questions. If PCAP is such a powerful security tool, why hasn’t it already been widely adopted among the agencies? And is this movement within the federal agencies likely to migrate to the general business sector?

All-seeing benefits

“The packets never lie,” says Vectra’s EMEA director, Matt Walmsley. “Packet capture has long been the gold standard of primary evidence sources for network security forensics. It’s a bit-for-bit direct copy of the exact traffic that was transmitted across the monitored network. It’s not an interpretation, it’s not a summary description – it’s the raw truth.” 

PCAP or It Didn't HappenPCAP collects everything. It is not designed to provide real time – or any – analysis. Analysis is left to add-ons or other security tools. The value of PCAP is the ability to see and capture in detail exactly what has happened. 

For this reason, many analysts believe that PCAP is best suited to (recent) historical analysis. “Full packet capture is purely for historical analysis,” says Oliver Tavakoli, CTO at Vectra. “It usually depends on some other detection capability to point the finger at packets of interest.”

Not everyone entirely agrees with this. “It is absolutely not only for historical analysis, “Joseph Carson, chief security scientist and advisory CISO at Thycotic, told SecurityWeek. “Full PCAP can also be used in real-time; however, this requires very well-crafted algorithms to help SOC Analysts determine which packets should be investigated and what can be fully automated.”

The addition of artificial intelligence to PCAP could well change the use and value of PCAP in future years.

Carson summarizes the value of PCAP. “Recently, I analyzed a severe ransomware incident. With the log data remaining it was only possible to get a partial view on how the attackers worked – but if I had full PCAP data then it would be possible to create a much more detailed attack path.”

Axellio SVP Stefan Pracht explains further: “Only packets,” he said, “can offer the insight into the timing and sequence of events, where the attack came from and which enterprise resources were involved with the malicious activity, what data was accessed in the attack or even exfiltrated and how the attack spread laterally through the network. Being able to play out the traffic of the actual attack also provides important insight into whether this happened before but went undetected and to determine whether any implemented mitigation is actually working.”

SolarWinds is a case in point. “We’d really like to know how whoever got onto the networks actually did what they did – and I mean exactly what they did,” says Sammy Migues, principal scientist at Synopsys. “Normal logs will capture that HostA talked to HostB and things like that; but what did they say? Enquiring minds want to know! What exactly did they change? How? How did they remain undetected? So many questions that might be answered with full packet captures.”

Brandon Pearce, AVP of federal and intelligence products at ‎AT&T Cybersecurity (and former CISO at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), goes into more detail. “Because PCAP allows direct examination at the packet level, government agencies can review it on their network forensically to find any anomalous behavior at this level. Compared to logging data, there is more of a chance to find previously unknown behavior like covert communication/exfiltration channels, command and control signals embedded in otherwise expected traffic, and so on.” 

Finding previously unknown activity at the packet level can reveal not only that something has happened, but how it happened. This gives agencies the data to form an actionable plan to counter an unwelcome presence in their network, and the hard evidence to show what happened. Logging at higher levels of the OSI model doesn’t give that same forensic level of information.

The cost problem

Apart from being the gold standard for network forensics, Walmsley adds, “It’s also highly voluminous, expensive to store, and extremely arduous to search and analyze manually at any meaningful scope.”

Cost is a problem. Capturing everything that crosses the entirety of a network requires a huge amount of storage. While storage costs are coming down, network traffic is going up, and it remains inhibitively expensive to store more than a few days of PCAP data. “Performing full packet capture on a one gigabit per second link (note that fast links are now running at 100 gigabits per second or more),” explains Tavakoli, “can require upward of 10 terabytes a day in storage. This practically means that it becomes a race against time: if an organization can afford to store 10 days of full packet capture, it is effectively betting that it will find an attack within 10 days of its initiation.”

If a company does not have the resources to effectively analyze that amount of data quickly, it is hard to justify the expense of PCAP. “PCAP has a place,” says Richard Bejlitch, principal security strategist at Corelight, “but one must balance trade-offs of storage, ability to query, and other factors. I would encourage agencies looking into upgrading their network security monitoring infrastructure to first see if transaction logs could solve their problems, with targeted or ‘smart’ PCAP for edge cases and additional inquiry. A ‘full PCAP first’ approach can be costly and slow compared to the alternatives.”

Apart from the choice between full or just partial PCAP collection, there is a potential problem in staffing. “Storage limitations may necessitate choosing from which network segments to capture traffic,” says Joseph Salazar, technical deception engineer/ technical marketing engineer at Attivo. “Much like storage constraints result in lost evidence, lack of coverage leads to missing PCAPs and blind spots during analysis. Finally, analyzing PCAPs requires experience and training to extract the relevant data needed for an investigation, whether it is a binary payload or an exfiltrated data file. With the training and personnel challenges facing the cybersecurity industry, this is not a need that organizations can quickly fill.”

Balancing privacy rights issues

Privacy is another issue that needs to be considered. “PCAP files,” explains Matt Walmsley, EMEA director at Vectra, “can be used to reconstruct clear-text session and data payloads. This can open up the time-honored question of user privacy versus the defending organization’s need to protect. Where traffic is encrypted and the encryption keys are not available, then there are still insights that can be gained if one knows where and how to look. In fact, all network traffic, encrypted or otherwise, contains subtle high-fidelity signals within the vast quantities of legitimate communications that can betray the presence of a threat actor active inside the organization as they develop their attack.”

Carson adds, “Full PCAP on encrypted data does not allow the analyst to see the content. However, the metadata from the headers can be helpful when analyzing incidents or performing threat hunting activities.”

Nevertheless, the use of encryption on the network changes the calculations. 

Kyle Huddart, lead principal analyst at Talion, explains: “The biggest crux (as with all monitoring solutions) is that for this to be effective for web traffic, you need to have SSL inspection available and access to the certificates to decrypt the information. This is where privacy kicks in. Full packet capture of users’ HTTPS traffic could reveal sensitive information should they be using personal websites within a corporate network (banking/medical etc).” This can be negated by applying the decryption certificate to only certain categories of website (for example, don’t decrypt banking or medical sites); but it is worth noting this method is reliant upon the web categorization of a proxy and adds complexity and therefore cost to the solution.

“In most modern communications,” says Vectra’s Tavakoli, “the packets would be encrypted. On such connections all that would be visible is that communication between two systems occurred and how much data was exchanged.” It must be asked, then, whether the cost of PCAP can be justified in an environment that effectively doesn’t allow full PCAP. 

Here there are two options. The first is to abandon full PCAP in favor of one of the increasingly powerful AI-based network detection and response systems. The second is to break your own encryption. “Most organizations insisting on packet capture,” continued Tavakoli, “also look into schemes where the encryption can be broken via an active ‘man-in-the-middle’ scheme or by placing an agent on endpoints to access a copy of the encryption keys.” This, however, returns the privacy issues to front and center. 

Some PCAP-based solutions attempt to solve the problem with additional technology. One example, explains Axellio’s Pracht, “requires packet capture solutions to carefully manage both data storage and access. Information can be identified and ‘masked’, meaning the information is overwritten. This can be done either permanently before writing it to disk or masked when displaying to the user. With some of this information being essential for analysis such as address information, access to this information needs to be carefully managed by limiting access on who can see and review the data, and managing user permissions at different authority levels.”

The collection of employee content is a thorny issue, and its acceptability may come down to the legal jurisdiction in operation. However, provided the collected data is kept safe and secure, and access to it is limited to the security team tasked with keeping the network secure, then it could be argued that the data collection is necessary to maintain the company in business.

The future of PCAP

PCAP is at an inflection point. Will decreasing storage costs and improved and automated AI-based analysis bring it within the budget of more companies? Or will improving AI-based network detection and response (NDR) solutions render full PCAP redundant? 

“Full packet processing (but without capturing the packets for posterity) is the province of products which do Network Detection and Response,” explains Tavakoli. “These products provide an opportunity to apply AI to fields (referred to as metadata) extracted from the packets in service of detecting threats in real time.”

The only thing that is certain is that the closer the analysis remains to the totality of packet content, the more accurate the analysis will be. And the less automated that analysis, the longer it will take and the more effort it will require. Realtime NDR, however, will not provide the depth of forensic evidence available to full PCAP.

One final comment. If you collect and store full PCAP files, you had better store them securely. “Having an attacker steal all your PCAPs,” warns Migues, “might actually be worse than having that attacker run rampant in your organization for weeks and months. All the information is right there–emails, documents, browsing histories, proprietary code, and so on without them having to break into every computer to get it. Having your PCAPs used against you in court would harsh anyone’s buzz.”

This may explain the agencies’ late push to PCAP. “I think there could have been a lot of red tape for the US government to use full packet capture,” suggests Talion’s Huddart, “mainly because if they were, for example, sharing classified information across the network – that would then reside in the full packet capture information and could be reconstructed by potentially unwanted eyes.” SolarWinds has changed our thinking.

Related: Encrypted Network Traffic Comes at a Cost

Related: Group Seeks Investigation of Deep Packet Inspection Use by ISPs

Related: FireEye to Acquire Network Forensics Firm nPulse in $70 Million Deal

view counter

Kevin Townsend is a Senior Contributor at SecurityWeek. He has been writing about high tech issues since before the birth of Microsoft. For the last 15 years he has specialized in information security; and has had many thousands of articles published in dozens of different magazines – from The Times and the Financial Times to current and long-gone computer magazines.

Previous Columns by Kevin Townsend:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/bOCWhG103SM/all-eyes-pcap-gold-standard-traffic-analysis




US lawmakers Press Online Ad Auctioneers Over User Data

A bipartisan group of US senators on Friday sent letters to major digital ad exchanges, including Google and Twitter, asking whether user data was sold to foreign entities who could use it for blackmail or other malicious ends.

In the real-time bidding process to decide which personalized ads a user sees when a web page loads, hundreds of businesses receive a user’s personal information, including search history, IP address, age and gender.

Questions about the sale of data gathered during the auction process were also sent to AT&T, Index Exchange, Magnite, OpenX, PubMatic and Verizon, according to the office of Senator Ron Wyden, a Democrat representing Oregon.

“Few Americans realize that some auction participants are siphoning off and storing ‘bidstream’ data to compile exhaustive dossiers about them,” Wyden and other senators wrote in letters to the companies.

“This information would be a goldmine for foreign intelligence services that could exploit it to inform and supercharge hacking, blackmail, and influence campaigns.”

While online ad exchanges use automated bidding systems to determine which ads to show people using internet services, data such as user locations, devices, and web activity can be gathered, according to the senators.

“These dossiers are being openly sold to anyone with a credit card, including to hedge funds, political campaigns, and even to governments,” the senators wrote.

Questions sent to the companies included what information is gathered about people in the course of serving up ads and which foreign firms have bought such data from them, according to the release.

The companies were given until May 4 to provide answers.

Twitter told AFP it had received the letter and intended to respond. The other companies did not immediately respond to queries for comment.

Google has pledged to steer clear of tracking individual online activity when it begins implementing a new system for targeting ads without the use of so-called “cookies.”

The internet giant’s widely used Chrome browser recently began testing an alternative to the tracking practice that it believes could improve online privacy while still enabling advertisers to serve up relevant messages.

view counter

© AFP 2020

Previous Columns by AFP:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/1FztLbb27_k/us-lawmakers-press-online-ad-auctioneers-over-user-data




SecureDrop Workstation Gets Post-Audit Security Refresh

The open-source SecureDrop Workstation has undergone a security makeover after a third-party security audit flagged multiple problems, including a high-risk bug that could allow an attacker to plant files on target machines.

The SecureDrop Workstation audit, conducted by Trail of Bits and financed by the New York Times, warned that the high-risk directory traversal bug could be leveraged for code execution attacks.

“The high severity finding details case where a malicious SecureDrop server could create files in arbitrary paths in the sd-app VM, which may allow for a code execution,” according to the audit report [PDF].

“When the SecureDrop Workstation client downloads a file, it stores it in a location derived from the filename returned by the server. However, since this location is not sanitized properly in all cases, an attacker who controls responses from the server can make the client save files in arbitrary paths on the filesystem. An attacker can use this vulnerability to plant files that potentially enable further vulnerabilities.”

The Trail of Bits code auditors found two cases when a malicious SecureDrop server could plant files.

Overall, the security assessment gave SecureDrop workstation a positive security bill of health. 

“We were unable to achieve a direct compromise of the Workstation from the position of an Internet-based attacker during our engagement,” Trail of Bits said, but made it clear this doesn’t imply that such a compromise exists or that SecureDrop Workstation is free of bugs.

SecureDrop Workstation is currently managed by the Freedom of the Press Foundation. Based on Qubes OS, the platform enables secure and encrypted communications between news organizations, journalists, sources and whistleblowers. It is currently being used in a limited pilot.

The Foundation said the audit report confirmed some its  assumptions around the use of virtualization to segment sensitive workloads and was pleased with the finding that the system system “represents a complex but well researched product that has been thoughtfully designed.”

None of the issues identified were directly exploitable by an attacker, and require either compromise of the SecureDrop server, or code execution in certain key VMs within the SecureDrop Workstation, the Foundation said.

Over the course of their engagement (6 person-weeks with two pen-test/code audit engineers), Trail of Bits found and documented 1 high-risk, 6 medium-risk, 7 low and 12 informational disclosure problems.

The audit confirmed that the high-severity and six of the medium-severity issues have already been patched and released, with the fixes validated by the auditing team. 

The Foundation said it is also investigating potential architectural improvements, including the creation of a custom RPC service to handle opening of files.

“In addition to addressing the findings surfaced in this report, we are also implementing feedback from current pilot participants, and planning new features around export and integration to other communication tools. We are in the process of expanding the pilot to several other news organizations, and hope to provide general availability later this year,” the Foundation said.

view counter

Ryan Naraine is Editor-at-Large at SecurityWeek and host of the popular Security Conversations podcast series. Ryan is a journalist and cybersecurity strategist with more than 20 years experience covering IT security and technology trends. He is a regular speaker at cybersecurity conferences around the world.
Ryan has built security engagement programs at major global brands, including Intel Corp., Bishop Fox and Kaspersky GReAT. He is a co-founder of Threatpost and the global SAS conference series. Ryan’s career as a journalist includes bylines at major technology publications including Ziff Davis eWEEK, CBS Interactive’s ZDNet, PCMag and PC World.
Follow Ryan on Twitter @ryanaraine.

Previous Columns by Ryan Naraine:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/160J-vA58qQ/securedrop-workstation-gets-post-audit-security-refresh




Financial Sector Remains Most Targeted by Threat Actors: IBM

Organizations in the financial and insurance sectors were the most targeted by threat actors in 2020, continuing a trend that was first observed roughly five years ago, IBM Security reports.

Manufacturing and energy became the second and third most targeted industries last year, respectively. Retail and professional services rounded up the top five most targeted sectors, IBM says.

In the latest installment of their annual X-Force Threat Intelligence Index, IBM Security also reveals that ransomware was the most popular attack method in 2020, with a market share of roughly 23%.

“Threat actors carried out ransomware attacks predominantly by gaining access to victim environments via remote desktop protocol, credential theft, or phishing—attack vectors that have been similarly exploited to install ransomware in prior years,” IBM explains.

The operators behind the Sodinokibi (REvil), which is said to have been the most prevalent ransomware family in 2020, are believed to have made in excess of $123 million in profits during last year alone.

IBM’s security researchers also note that more than half of the ransomware attacks observed in 2020 used a double extortion strategy, where, in addition to files being encrypted, data was stolen and victims threatened with public exposure unless the ransom was paid. IBM estimates that 36% of the public breaches in 2020 were ransomware-related data leaks.

Data theft attacks, IBM says, went up 160% compared to 2019, but accounted for only 13% of the overall incidents in 2020. Server access came in third at 10%, marking a 233% increase year-over-year, while Business Email Compromise (BEC) dropped to fourth position with 9% market share (a drop from 14% in 2019).

Last year, vulnerability scanning and exploitation was the top attack vector, being employed in 35% of all incidents that IBM observed. The top ten most targeted flaws were CVE-2019-19781 (Citrix ADC), CVE-2018-20062 (NoneCMS ThinkPHP), CVE-2006-1547 (Apache Struts), CVE-2012-0391 (Apache Struts), CVE-2014-6271 (GNU), CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep), CVE-2020-8515 (DrayTek Vigor), CVE-2018-13382 and CVE-2018-13379 (Fortinet FortiOS), CVE-2018-11776 (Apache Struts), and CVE-2020-5722 (Grandstream UCM6200).

Last year, phishing was employed in 33% of attacks, being the second most commonly used infection vector. Credential theft, on the other hand, only accounted for 18% of attacks, dropping significantly from the previous year (when it accounted for 29% of incidents).

IBM also noticed a significant increase in the number of reported vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS), which reached 468 last year, up 49% from 2019.

Most of the malicious attacks observed in 2020 hit Europe, North America, and Asia, with attacks targeting European organizations registering a spike.

Europe accounted for 31% of the observed attacks, up 10% percentage points from 2019, with ransomware being the most common threat, at 21% of all attacks. North America, on the other hand, was hit by 27% of assaults, a significant drop from the 44% incidents it accounted for the previous year.

Related: Number of ICS Vulnerabilities Continued to Increase in 2020: Report

Related: NSA Publishes Cybersecurity Year in Review Report

view counter

Ionut Arghire is an international correspondent for SecurityWeek.

Previous Columns by Ionut Arghire:
Tags:

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Securityweek/~3/-0U_56xnvUk/financial-sector-remains-most-targeted-threat-actors-ibm