First, Google has said it intends to appeal judge Mehta’s ruling—meaning that any remedies will likely enter force only after all avenues for appeal have been exhausted and the ruling becomes final. Similarly, Google intends to fight its most recent loss, according to Lee-Anne Mulholland, its vice president of regulatory affairs. This too will delay—or perhaps stop—any concrete action being taken.
It’s impossible to know how long this process will take. Most likely, it will be several years before we reach a point of finality. At the risk of sounding clichéd, allow me to quote Winston Churchill: “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
And even then, it will take more time before we see meaningful diversity in search. Google is still the go-to search engine for the vast majority of internet users, despite the fact that there is a growing unhappiness with the quality of its search results. Consumers have options—and some might even be better than Google—but they stick with the search engine they know out of habit.
Habits, as we all know, are notoriously difficult to break. In the case of Google, we are talking about a search engine that has enjoyed over two decades of dominance and is now a generic verb for “searching online.” While the end of its preferential status on most browsers will, over time, result in many consumers switching, it’s important to remember that this won’t be an instant process. Patience is a virtue.
Bring back competition
So, what will a greatly diminished Google mean for the advertising ecosystem? Let’s refer back to the judgements in the first antitrust case—specifically, the one concerning its browser and search business.
Because Google had a dominant position in search—and, in fact, was the only real meaningful player in search—it could treat advertisers however it wished without fearing any repercussions. Google would, for example, take 20% of all revenue from ads served using its technology on third-party sites, according to a newspaper executive who testified during the trial. With respect to ads served directly on Google, the evidence presented showed that the absence of any real competition had allowed for Google to charge “supracompetitive prices” for text advertisements.


